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I. Introduction
In May of 2008, the California Supreme Court held that same sex partners
had a constitutional right to marry.1 In November of 2008, the voters of
*

Professor, Chicago-Kent College of Law. Many thanks to Anne Dailey, Stephen
Heyman, Harold Krent, Michelle Oberman, Mark Rosen and Kimberley Yuracko for very
helpful comments on earlier drafts. Thanks also to Marcia Lehr for exemplary research
assistance.
1
In Re Marriage Cases, 193 P2d 384, 399 (Ca. 2008) (“[The] core substantive rights [of
marriage] include the opportunity of an individual to establish . . . an officially
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California voted to amend the constitution to define marriage as between a man
and a woman.2 In May of 2009, deciding to uphold that voter referendum, the
California Supreme Court held that same sex couples had a fundamental right to
“establish an officially recognized family relationship,”3 but not a fundamental
right to the name marriage itself. In doing so, the Supreme Court of California
disaggregated family rights from family status, finding a constitutional right to
the former even while accepting the voters’ ability to restrict access to the latter.
By disaggregating rights from status in this way the California Court was
following a trend, not only for courts challenged by the same sex marriage
question, but in family law generally. In the course of the last 30 years, courts
and legislatures have often distilled the rights associated with family
relationships from the traditional names or statuses associated with those
relationships. Non-traditional family structures have put increasing pressure on
the law and private parties to recognize different kinds of family relationships. In
response, the law has started to grant alternative family members rights, without
granting them family status.
Consider the well-known case of Michael H. 4 Michael H. was the wealthy,
worldly young man who bounced between homes in Los Angeles and St.
Thomas, sometimes with the married woman with whom he was having an affair,
sometimes with the child born as a result of the affair, but not always or in any
permanent sense with either of them. Michael H. went to court claiming a
constitutional right to parental status, just as plaintiffs in the same-sex marriage
cases have claimed a constitutional right to marital status. Michael, like many of
the same-sex marriage plaintiffs, was denied a right to family status, but he did
not go home empty handed. Justice Stevens, the swing vote in Michael H. v.
Gerald D., voted to deny Michael the status of father because whatever the rights
that his biological connection and relationship to his daughter gave him, they
were honored by a state statute that allowed him to petition for visitation rights.5
recognized and protected family . . . [that is] . . . entitled to the same respect and dignity
as marriage.”)
2
The voter referendum was generally known as Proposition 8. See
http://voterguide.sos.ca.gov/past/2008/general/text-proposed-laws/text-of-proposedlaws.pdf#prop8.
3
“Proposition 8 reasonably must be interpreted in a limited fashion, as eliminating only
the right of same sex couples to equal access to the designation of marriage and as not
otherwise affecting the constitutional right those couples to establish an officially
recognized family relationship.” Strauss v. Horton, 207 P2d 48, 93 Cal Rptr 591, 642
(2009).
4
Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 US 110 (1989).
5
There was much dispute about whether someone like Michael actually could obtain
visitation rights under the California statute. The dissent read the existing California
family law precedent as precluding Michael from being awarded visitation against the
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In other words, Michael was denied parental status but not necessarily all the
rights of parenthood. Comparably, same sex couples have often won the right to
the legal incidents of marriage, with Civil Unions and Domestic Partnerships, but
been denied marital status.
Plaintiffs like Michael H. and the same sex couples who argue that they have
a constitutional right to family status do not always lose.6 Constitutional doctrine
suggests that there are fundamental rights to both marital and parental status, but
those rights are limited, cabined by the social meaning of the terms marriage and
parenthood.
Constitutional doctrine also suggests that the law may be
compelled to recognize family rights even if they do not grant family status.
Constitutions may protect rights to be treated as in relationship with another as a
legal matter. This latter protection is what Michael and many of the gay and
lesbian plaintiffs went home with, even if it was not all that they wanted.
The trend to disaggregate rights from status does not always have a
constitutional dimension. Sometimes judges, legislatures and private actors grant
rights in the absence of status even if there is no recognized constitutional need to
do so. One can remain agnostic on the question of whether state or federal
constitutions mandate recognition of family relationship rights even in the
absence of recognizing family relationship status, and still acknowledge that
many legal actors feel an affirmative duty to honor relationship rights even in the
absence of family status.7
mother’s wishes. It is unclear what the 4 dissenters would have ruled if they had believed,
as Justice Stevens did, that Michael had a reasonable chance of being awarded visitation
– though not parental status – over the mother’s objection.
6
See infra Parts IIIA and B.
7
For the most part, this article collapses the distinctions between the federal and state
constitutions because they are not relevant to the arguments made here. First, the
relationship between a state constitution and state family law is essentially the same as
the relationship between the federal constitution and state family law. The constitutional
questions, whether brought under a state or federal document, involve the same kinds of
constitutional values (see Baker v. Vermont, 744 A2d 864, 870-873 (Vt. 1999) discussing principle of equality under Vermont Common Benefits Clause, noting how it
is slightly different than federal Equal Protection clause, but also explaining notions of
equality; Goodridge v. Dept of Pub. Health, 798 NE2d 941, 956-960 (Mass. 2003) discussing what it means for something to be a civil right, using U.S. supreme Court
cases; Lewis v. Harris, 188 NJ 415, 434-436, 908 A.2d 196 (NJ 2006) - discussing
meaning of the term fundamental liberty interest under the New Jersey due process clause
using U.S. Supreme Court cases), the same kinds of analysis (see Baker, Goodridge and
Lewis, id. - following U.S. Supreme court as guidance on questions of scrutiny), the same
precedents ( Id.) and the same balance of power issues (See in particular, Baker at 887889 - discussing importance of deferring to legislature and Lewis at 458-462 – same.)
Collapsing the federal/state distinction allows one to proceed with a constitutional
analysis without having to filter through the different political and social perspectives that
clearly do distinguish many state supreme courts from the federal one.
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Conferring family status bestows on someone the legal rights and obligations
accompanying that status, but it also honors the expressive value implicit in
labeling. Conferring the legal rights and obligations of relationship honors the
constitutive benefits that flow from being connected to another. The ability to
dissagregate legal incidents from status allows courts and legislatures to
recognize alternative relationships without necessarily disrupting the social
meaning of either marriage or parenthood. This article explores the legal
dimensions of family status and family rights, explains how they are different,
and analyzes the potential problems with disaggregating them.
Critical to the analysis presented here is the recognition that, legally,
marriage and parenthood are comparable institutions. To date, few scholars have
embraced the links between the legal treatment of marriage and parenthood.
Some scholars have clearly separated them, assuming or stating that they have
nothing to do with each other. 8 I argue that isolating the legal treatments,
particularly the constitutional treatment, of marriage and parenthood from each
other makes little sense. The vast majority of cases to ever discuss the
constitutional dimensions of either parenthood or marriage refer to parenthood
and marriage together, as if the rights are clearly akin to each other.9
8

Anita Bernstein writes that “marriage is different . .. from the other key status category
of family law – parenthood – in that the relation between parent and child addresses a
relatively clear and uncontroverted need. Infants cannot survive without resources from
adults.” Anita Bernstein, For and Against Marriage, 102 MICH. L. REV. 129, 132 (2003).
Not one of the cases addressing the right to parental status involved children’s needs
though. In all but one case in which a man has claimed a right to parental status, the
child’s needs were being readily met by both the mother and another man. See Michael
H. v. Gerald D., supra 1; Quilloin v. Wolcott, 434 US 246 (1978); Lehr v. Robertson,
463 US 248 (1983); Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979). In the one case when
there was not another man to provide for the child, the state was claiming a desire to do
so. See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 US 645 (1972). Cass Sunstein compares state conferral
of marital status with parental status and assumes (wrongly, I think) that parental status is
afforded substantially more protection. “If I am the biological parent of a child, the state
must have an extremely good reason to sever my relationship with that child.” Cass
Sunstein, The Right to Marry, 26 CARD. L . REV 2081. Presumably, Sunstein was
referring to the clear and convincing evidence the state must have of abuse and neglect
before terminating a pre-existing parent’s legal status as parent, but all of the cases just
cited involved biological fathers and Michael H. was biological father who also had an
established relationship with his child. In all of those cases, the court vested parental
status in someone else simply because the state thought that would be in the best interest
of the child.
9
See e.g. Meyer v. Nebraska , 262 US 390, 399 ( 1923) “the right of the individual . . .
to engage in any of the common occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to
marry, establish a home and bring up children . . . . “ “[I]t is clear that among the
decisions that an individual may make without unjustified government interference are
personal decisions ‘relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships
and child rearing and education . . . .” Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 US 374, 385 (1978),
quoting Carey v. Population Services, 431 US 678. ; “This court has long recognized . . .

4
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Traditionally, marital status determined parental status and the existence of
parental rights was contingent on the state of one’s marriage. And, even though
parental rights are usually cast as negative rights and marital rights are usually
cast as positive rights both sets of rights are usually protected for the same
reasons.
The article proceeds as follows. Part II provides a brief description of what
has been happening to claims for family recognition in the last 30 years. It
describes the various ways courts and legislatures have embraced the
disaggregation of family rights from family status in both the marital and parental
contexts. “Domestic partnerships” and “Civil Unions,” “De Facto Parents” and
“Equitable Parents” are now widely used legal constructs that treat people as
entitled to the rights (and sometimes liable for the obligations) of legally
recognized relationship. The proliferation of these new legal categories
demonstrates how the law has responded to the need to treat people as in
relationship legally, even as the law has resisted expanding the traditional legal
statuses of marriage and parenthood.
Part III explores the expressive value of marital and parental status. It
examines why people may have an interest in the expressive value of marriage
and parenthood and how and why courts have protected rights to those statuses.
The expressive value of marriage is more obvious, both in practice and in the
cases, than the expressive value of parenthood. But when analyzed together it
becomes clear that the ability to claim either marital or parental status has
expressive value. Because of the immensely meaningful role that family
relationships play in our individual and collective lives, access to the family
status label is very important to people. Thus, while no one refutes a state’s
ability to regulate aspects of marriage and parenthood, the cases strongly suggest
that a state must be careful in restricting access to those labels. If an individual’s
relationship comports well enough with the social understanding of family status,
he or she is constitutionally entitled to express him or herself through that status.
Part IV explores why and how the law protects not just marital and parental
status but the kinds of relationships that have traditionally been known as
marriage and parenthood. Drawing on psychological and philosophical theories
of relationship, as well as on the legal scholarship of both marriage and
parenthood, Part IV argues that the legal incidents of marriage and parenthood
are recognized legally for similar reasons. They are recognized because being
entwined with another legally, economically, morally, and socially has such a
profound effect on who one is, what one wants and how one sees oneself in the
world. When the law bestows the rights and obligations that treat one as in
family relationship with another, the law honors the liberty associated with being
able to exist with another as a unitary entity.
freedom of personal choice in matters of marriage and family life . . . “ Cleveland Bd of
Educ. v LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639-640 (1974).
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Part V elaborates on how the constitutional nomenclature surrounding the
family, in particular the rhetoric of rights involving intimacy, privacy and
autonomy has fostered confusion in this area. Part V then explores in some more
detail why there might be a substantive due process right to the legal incidents of
family relationship, even in the absence of a right to family status.
Part VI will argue that the tendency to disaggregate both marital and parental
rights from marital and parental status jeopardizes the traditional constitutional
protection of families. First, to the extent we value the expressive benefits
associated with assuming family status, those benefits will dissipate as alternative
family statuses proliferate. Getting married and being a parent will likely not
mean the same thing if there are many other kinds of marriage-lite and parent-lite
arrangements available. Some may view the availability of more family options
as a positive development, but if nothing else, the same-sex marriage debate
shows that many people on both the right and left side of the political spectrum
want to retain some of the traditional expressive dimension of marriage.
Second, courts and legislatures have shown themselves much more willing to
confer rights than impose obligations on non-traditional family members. By
diminishing the legal responsibilities associated with family relationships, courts
and legislatures diminish the constitutive nature of family relationships. The less
formative and defining a relationship is to one’s selfhood, the less it needs any
legal protection at all. The need to recognize certain relationships because they
are so important to the people in them diminishes if relationships come to be seen
more as voluntary associations that bring with them rights and benefits but no
responsibilities or obligations.
Third, the more legally varied and individuated family-like relationships
become, the more necessary it will be for courts to insert themselves inside those
relationships to ascertain individual rights and responsibilities. The more courts
insert themselves inside some family relationships, the less likely courts will be
to honor notions of relationship privacy and autonomy for all family
relationships.
The recent legislative activity embracing same sex marriage10 and many
public opinion polls showing increasing support for same sex marriage11 suggest
that the social meaning of marriage is changing. Enough people in enough
places will soon believe that marriage is not essentially heterosexual. Once that
happens, there will be less need to disaggregate marital rights from marital status
because same sex couples will have access to marital status. But before same-sex
marriage is fully recognized, many states will probably adopt an intermediary
disaggregative position. States that cling to traditional definitions of marriage
10

Legislative bodies in Vermont, New Hampshire and Maine have all voted to recognize
same sex marriages. See http://www.hrc.org/issues/marriage.asp
11
See CNN Poll:
Generations disagree on Same Sex Marriage,
http://www.cnn.com/2009/Us/04/samesex.marriage.poll/

6

7

Marriage and Parenthood

[July 20, 2009]

will adopt Civil Unions and Domestic Partnership regimes before they adopt
marriage.
Comparably, courts and legislature will probably continue to grant parental
rights without granting parental status.12 As with marriage, it may be that the
pressure to disaggregate is greatest in those political communities that most resist
changing traditional family definitions. For instance, courts in states that neither
recognize any form of same sex union nor allow second parent adoptions, often
award visitation and custody to non-biological same-sex partners. The
recognition of either the same sex partnership or the adoption would give the
partner parental status and thus the automatic right to petition for visitation and
custody. Yet several courts have found that the failure of the legislature to confer
parental status is irrelevant to the question of whether the non-biological same
sex partner is entitled to parental rights. 13 These courts thus make a clear
distinction between family status and family rights. They award the latter even if
the legislature has resisted conferring the former.
Providing family rights without providing family status in this way may seem
like a cautious, intermediary step, but in the end this article suggests that it may
be a move that does more to threaten traditional constitutional protection of
relationship than honor it.

II. THE DISAGGREGATION OF FAMILY STATUS FROM FAMILY RIGHTS (AND
OBLIGATIONS)
In the past 30 years, it has become abundantly clear that many people, not
just people in traditional family relationships, very much want the law to treat
them as in relationship with a significant other.
When asking for legal
recognition of their relationships, these people do not make contract claims. They
do not claim an entitlement based on an agreement with another. They make
situational claims, or claims of entitlement based on the nature of their emotional
and physical connection to another.14

12

Many academic commentators endorse the idea of expanding rights without
necessarily expanding status. See infra note 40.
13
TB v. LRM, 567 Pa. 222, 232, 786 A 2d 913, 918 (2001) (“The ability to marry the
biological prent and the ability to adopt the subject child have never been and are not now
factors in determining whether the third party assumed a parental status and discharged
parental duties.”); Mason v. Dwinnell, 660 SE2d 58, 64 (2008) (“[W]e find immaterial
Dwinnel’s arguments that she and Mason could not marry, and Mason could not adopt
the child under North Carolina law. . . . “).
14
By situational, I mean claims based on their lives as lived, not on explicit or implicit
agreements. See, for instance, the affidavit that UCLA uses to determine entitlement to
domestic partner benefits. “We are each other’s sole domestic partner and intend to
remain so indefinitely. We are in a relationship of mutual support, caring and
commitment. We are financially interdependent.” Cited in Grace Blumberg, The
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For reasons that have a great deal to do with the United States’ “shadow” or
“employee” welfare state, many of the initial claims to rights in the partner
context were made in the private sector. They were made by employees who
wanted to give their partners access to the considerable array of welfare benefits
that, in the United States, are provided by employers to employees and their
families.15 Notably, these claims were made predominantly by same-sex
cohabitants, not by opposite sex cohabitants, even though opposite sex
cohabitants outnumber their gay counterparts by a significant margin.16
Opposite sex couples may not have pushed as hard for these benefits because
they knew their claims would ring hallow given their option to marry, or, they
may not have pushed hard because they actually did not want them. If they had
wanted to be treated as a unit by the outside world, they could marry. It was the
same sex couples who had no other means of being treated as one.
The first employer to offer domestic partner benefits to its employees was the
Village Voice, in 1982.17 In 1992, Lotus Development Corporation became the
first publicly traded company to do so. By 2001, more than 2500 public and
private employers extended health care benefits to domestic partners. 18 These
plans cannot be viewed as purely private agreements. Although the federal
government has so far refused to confer the same tax advantages on same sex
couple plans as it does on plans covering married couples,19 government policymakers routinely rely on private employer plans when they design health care
plans.20 The availability of these plans lets people who might not otherwise have
a reasonable chance of obtaining health insurance coverage do so. The existence
of these private plans also influenced various governmental bodies, facilitating
government recognition of same sex relationship, at least in the employment
context.

Regularization of Nonmarital Cohabitation: Rights and Responsibilities in the American
Welfare State, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REV 1265 1289 (2001)
15
These benefits include health and disability insurance and access to retirement plans.
In most other industrialized countries, these type of claims would be made in the public
sector because it is the state that plays the primary role in providing social insurance
programs.
16
See Blumberg, supra note 14 at 1286.
17
See Human Rights Campaign, What Are Domestic Partner Benefits, at http://
www.hrc.org/worknet/dp/dp whatisdp.asp
18
Id.
19
2003 TNT 188-24 Health Coverage for Dependent Domestic Partner Not Gross
Income, Wages.
20
None of the major health care reform proposals involve dispensing with employerbased health care completely.
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At the same time employers were beginning to recognize relationship status
in the private sector, 21 same-sex marriage advocates were beginning their
campaign for legally recognized gay marriage. In the last 18 years, same-sex
marriage advocates have successfully argued that gays and lesbians are
constitutionally entitled to marital status in five states.22 Just as important, they
have forced courts and legislatures to articulate what same sex couples are
entitled to if they are not entitled to marital status.
The state of Hawaii, after its Supreme Court ruled that the state Equal
Rights Amendment forbade the state from prohibiting gays and lesbians from
marrying each other, brokered a kind of compromise in which the voters
approved a constitutional amendment defining marriage as “between a man and a
woman,” but the state legislature passed domestic partner legislation allowing
two people who could not marry each other the right to register as domestic
partners. 23 In Baker v. Vermont24 and Lewis v. Harris,25 the supreme courts of
Vermont and New Jersey required their state legislatures to pass legislation that
allowed gay and lesbian couples access to a fully equal set of relationship rights
and obligations as those available to straight couples.26 New Jersey explicitly

21

Most of these employer based programs confer benefits without requiring significant
obligation. To the extent these plans confer pension rights, they often do not require that
an employee share pension accumulation with their ex-partner in the event of separation..
See Blumberg, supra note 14 at 1291-92. Married people, in contrast, are required to
share pension benefits. Although there is virtually always fighting about how much
should be shared and why, every state in the country gives a divorcing spouse a claim to
pension rights earned by the other spouse during the course of the marriage.
22
Hawaii found the right to marry as a matter of gender equality. Baehr v. Lwein, 852
P2d 44 (Haw 1993), but a subsequent voter initiative restricted marriage to opposite sex
couples. Connecticut and Iowa found that gays and lesbians were a suspect class and that
restrictions on same-sex marriage constituted impermissible discrimination on the basis
of sexual orientation. Kerrigan v. Commissioner, 951 A. 2d 407 (2008); Varnum v.
O’Brien, 763 NW2d 862 (Iowa 2009). The Massachusetts Supreme Court relied little on
either fundamental rights or equality jurisprudence, holding that in the family law area
the doctrines were inextricably intertwined and that there was no rational reason to
restrict marriage to opposite couples anyway. Goodridge v. Dpt of Pub. Health, 798
NE2d 941, 953, 961 (Mass. 2003). The California case, In Re Marriage Cases, 193 P2d
384 (Ca. 2008) was significantly altered by Proposition 8 and the subsequent judicial
interpretation of what that meant. See Strauss v. Horton, 93 Cal Rptr 591 (2009).
23
See Blumberg, supra note 14 at 277-78.
24
744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999).
25
908 A2d 196 (NJ 2006).
26
Both courts decided this as a matter of equality doctrine, but the equality analysis did
not extend to the label marriage.
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found it permissible to deny opposite sex couples access to the marriage label.27
Vermont implied the same thing, but did not technically reach the question.28
After Proposition 8 and Strauss v. Horton 29 California’s law now operates as
New Jersey’s does.30
The Connecticut state legislature, aware that same sex marriage litigation
was pending, voted without any court mandate to extend full Civil Union benefits
to same-sex couples.31 New Hampshire, Maine, and Washington DC also
adopted extensive domestic partnership protection before their legislatures voted
to sanction same sex marriage.32 In addition, Oregon, Washington and hundreds
of municipalities have adopted some form of domestic partner legislation.33 The
effects of these domestic partnership provisions vary. They can, but do not
always, give the full panoply of marital state rights and obligations. Municipal
regulations operate more like private employer recognition of same sex
relationships because they involve few, if any, tax, property and future income
consequences.
The American Law Institute’s Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution34
also recommends treating couples who do not acquire marital status as being
legally in relationship to each other. Although some have criticized these
provisions for denying couples who do not want to be treated as an entity the
freedom to be single,35 the ALI has recommended treating non-married people
27

908 A2d at 211 (“[W]we cannot find that a right to same-sex marriage is so deeply
rooted in the traditions, history and conscience of the people of this state that it ranks as a
fundamental right.”)
28
744 A2d at 886 (“We hold that plaintiffs are entitled to obtain the same benefits and
protected afforded by Vermont law to married opposite-sex couples. . . . We do not
purport to infringe upon the prerogatives of the Legislature to craft an appropriate means
of addressing this constitutional mandate. . . . “)Vermont subsequently became the first
state to legislate same-sex marriage without being ordered to do so by the state Supreme
Court. See www.nytimes.com/2009/04/08/us/08vermont.html.
29
93 Cal Rptr 591, see supra note 2.
30
Though in California, same-sex couples have both a fundamental right and an equality
right to all the legal incidents of marriage. See Strauss v. Horton, 93 Cal Rptr at 624,
627.
31
The Connecticut Supreme Court subsequently required the state to recognize marriage,
on the theory that separate could not be equal. See Kerrigan, supra note 22.
32
See http://lambdalegal.org/nationwide-status-same-sex-relationships.html.
33
See id. for summary of state legislation giving same sex couples some form of
relationship status, but not marriage.
34
See American Law Institute, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION:
ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (2002) [herinafter ALI PRINCIPLES] , Chapter 6.
35
See, in particular, Elizabeth Scott, Domestic Partnerships, Implied Contracts and Law
Reform, in RECONCEIVING THE FAMILY: CRITIQUES ON THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE’S
PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION 331 (Wilson ed.) (2006) [herinafter
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who have not contracted into or around the background rules of marriage, as if
they were married. This treatment includes, importantly, holding both parties
economically accountable to the other in the event of dissolution. Both property
and compensatory payments (traditionally known as maintenance or alimony) are
to be awarded to domestic partners in accordance with the same principles as
those used in the marriage context.36 In other words, the law is supposed to treat
people as married even though they do not have the legal label of marriage.
In the parental arena, there has been a comparable and mostly concurrent
trend. In part because adults tend to drift into and out of relationships more than
they used to, in part because DNA testing allows us to determine genetic
parentage with certainty, in part because artificial insemination has become so
much more readily available, and in part because gay and lesbian parenting has
become less taboo, 37 non-traditional parents now routinely petition courts for
parental rights. And sometimes, legal parents petition courts in order to hold
non-traditional parents liable for parental obligations.38 Grandparents, stepparents and other third parties often enjoy statutorily protected rights to
visitation,39 and numerous scholars have called for a more expansive, less
exclusive view of parenthood, one that leaves room for the law to recognize
many different kinds of adult relationships in a child’s life.40

RECONCEIVING THE FAMILY] . See also , Margaret Brinig, Domestic Partnership and
Default Rules, Id. At 269; Marsha Garrison, Marriage Matters: What’s Wrong with the
ALI’s Domestic Partnership Proposal Id. At 305.
36
See ALI PRINCNIPLES, supra note 34 at §§ 6.05, 6.06
37
For more on how all of these factors are forcing the law to come to terms with what it
thinks the defining features of parenthood should be, see Katharine K. Baker,
Bionormativity and the Construction of Parenthood, 42 Ga L Rev 649 (2008).
38
See Katharine K. Baker, Bargaining or Biolog: The History and Future of Paternlity
Law and Parental Status, 14 Cornell J. of L. and Public Policy 1, 15-16 (2004).
39
See e.g. Margaret Mahoney, Step-parents as Third Parties In Relation to Their StepChildren, 40 FAM. L. Q 81, n. 82 (2006) (“The visitation status in a number of states
include stepparents under an umbrella provision that authorizes visitation petitions by
‘any person.’ . . . In other jurisdictions, the unrestricted category of stepparents is
specifically included in the visitation statute. “) 21 J. FAMILY ISSUES 246, 247-248
(2000) (“Grandparent visitation rights law were enacted in all 50 states over a period of
23 years.”) These rights must be treated as somewhat secondary to parental rights, but
they are still cognizable, see Troxel v. Granville, 530 US 57 (2000). A host of
grandparent visitation statues have been upheld even after Troxel.
40
Katharine T Bartlett, Rethinking Parenthood as an Exclusive Status: The Need for
Legal Laternative When the Premise of the Nuclear Family Has Failed, 70 Va L Rev 879
(1984) (suggesting that legal notions of parenthood should be expanded for families that
don’t live as a traditional nuclear family); Naomi Cahn, Reframing Child Custody
Decisionmaking, 58 OHIO ST. L. J 1 91997) (advocating the designation of many adults as
“parents”); Barbar Woodhouse, Hatching the Egg: A Child-Centered Perspective on
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In response to these trends, many courts have developed “de facto parent”
doctrines, “equitable parent” doctrines, and “parenthood by estoppel” doctrines.41
Usually these doctrines involve giving non-traditional parents visitation rights.
Less often, they involve holding non-traditional parents liable for child-support.
As in the cohabitation area, the American Law Institute has called for legal
recognition of these alternative parenting relationships. Advocating the adoption
of both a “de facto parent” class and a “parenthood by estoppel” doctrine, the
ALI supports an expansion of parental rights and, far more rarely, parental
responsibility.42 In short there has been widespread creation of legally
cognizable parental relationships, even in people who do not have the legal label
of parent.43
This article’s analysis of the dual dimensions of the legal treatment of
relationship helps explain the widespread tendency to disaggregate relationship
rights from relationship status. As family structures proliferate, something
compels the law to recognize them even as something else restricts the law’s
embrace of them. As Part III will argue, what keeps courts and legislatures from
embracing many different kinds of marriage and multiple forms of parenthood is
an allegiance to the social meaning of the institutions of marriage and
parenthood. That social meaning is not fixed, but neither is it infinitely
capacious. People only have a right to those institutions and to the expressive
potential implicit in their labels if those individuals’ situations comport to the
social understanding of those terms.
The
though.
same.44
enjoyed

law has been far more willing to legitimate claims for family rights
It has been willing to treat two people as one and force others to do the
It has been willing to award visitation rights to people who never
the legal status of parent and never attempted to get it.45 Although

Parent’s Rights, 14 CARD. L REV 1747 (1993)(advocating a more care-based approach to
parental rights).
41
See Baker, Bionormativity, supra note 37.
42
For more on the assymetrical way in which the ALI treats parental rights and
responsibilities, see Katharine K. Baker, Assymetric Parenthood, in RECONCEIVING THE
FAMILY at 121-128 supra note 35.
43
The ALI Principles of Family Dissolution leave the determination of legal parenthood
to someone else. One comment explains that determinations of legal paternity are “a
matter outside the scope of these Principles.” § 3.03 cmt. D, at 418. It is not clear why the
ALI draftsr felt comfortable passing over the question of legal parentage (e.g. parental
status) while embracing the task of determining parental-like rights and obligations, see
Baker, Assymetirc Parenthood, supra note 42 at 126-127.
44
This is what many aspects of domestic partnerships and civil unions do.
45
See ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 34, Chapter 2 (describing de facto parent doctrine);
ENO v. LMM, 711 NE2d 886 (Mass. 1999) (awarding visitation rights to a nonbiologically related lesbian co-parent); JAL v. EPH, 682 A2d 1314 (Pa. Super. 1996)
(same).
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initially resistant,46 many legal actors now feel compelled to honor most family
relationships as lived, even if they do not feel compelled to change the definition
of marriage and parenthood as legally defined. Parts III and IV explore why.

III: EXPRESSIVE LABELS
A. Marriage
As virtually every court47 and commentary48 to have engaged the question of
same sex marriage has noted, there are numerous material and nonmaterial legal
incidents of marriage. The legal incidents of marriage, for the most part, define
the variety of ways in which the law requires the government and private actors
to treat married people as a unit. But most people probably do not get married to
secure the legal incidents of marriage. They get married because the act of
getting married and being married conveys widely understood messages of unity
and commitment. 49
Getting married – as opposed to just living together or making a promise to
one’s partner - signifies a greater commitment in part because it is public ( it is
harder to break a promise that everyone knows one has made), in part because
state rules make it more onerous to break, but also because by marrying, people
attach themselves to an institution that that is bigger than themselves.
Individuals may try to define the terms of their own marriage for each other,50 but

46

The early gay marriage cases did not fair well. See Baker v. Nelson, 191 NW2d 185
(Minn. 1971), 409 US 810 (1972) (denying gay male couple the right to marry); Alison
D. v. Virginia M, 572 NE2d 27 (NY 1991) (denying non-biologically related lesbian coparent any visitation or custody rights). Several more state high courts have also resisted
more recent claims to gay marriage, see e.g. Conaway v. Deane, 932 A2d 571 (Md. 2007)
(denying any right to same sex marriage); Hernandez v. Robles, 855 NE2d 1 (NY 2006).
47
See e.g., Goodridge v. Dept of Pub. Health, 798 NE2d 941, 955-56 (Mass. 2003);
Lewis v. Harris, 908 A2d 196, 215 92006); Baker v. Vermont, 744 A.2d 864, 870 (1999);
Hernandez v. Robles 855 N.E.2d 1, 2 (2006)
48
See Bernstein, supra note 8; Sunstein, supra note 8 at 1090; David Chambers, What If?
The Legal Consequences of Marriage and the Legal Needs of Lesbian and Gay Male
Couples, 95 MICH. L. Rev. 447 (1996)
49
There is little question that, on average, those who commit to each other through
marriage end up making a more binding commitment than those who commit to each
other without getting married. See Marsha Garrison, Marriage Matters, supra note 35 at
308 (citing studies showing that only 105 of cohabitants who do not marry are together
after 5 years, whereas 80% of first marriages survive past 5 years and 66% of first
marriages survive past 1-0 years.)
50
Many individuals may also not feel this freedom. Social norms exert powerful forces
on the parties to a marriage and are likely to make them feel more committed and less
free to define the relationship as they want. See Elizabeth Scott, Social Norms and the
Legal Regulations of Marriage, 86 VA. L. REV. 1901 (2000).
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if they associate themselves with the institution of marriage, their relationship
will necessarily be interpreted by outsiders in certain ways.
For instance, it is very likely that others will view a marriage as a
relationship involving shared values, shared resources and significant emotional
support.51 Any given marriage may not involve these things and the state is
limited in the extent to which it can enforce the sharing of these things, but
sharing these things is what most people think married people do because that is
what marriage means. Thus getting married is a way of sending a message about
one’s relationship. One sends that message to the world, to one’s partner and
quite probably to oneself. The ability to send that message and attach oneself to
the institution of marriage appears to be enormously important to people. Most
people do it and even more people want to do it.52 Perhaps for this reason, the
Supreme Court has, at times, protected individuals’ right to marital status. 53
The United States Supreme Court has decided three different right to marry
cases. Richard Loving, a white man, and Mildred Loving, an African-American
woman, married in the District of Columbia but wanted to reside and stay
married in the state of Virginia.54 Virginia prohibited interracial marriage. Roger
Redhail wanted to marry his current girlfriend even though he was in arrears on a
51

People assume marriages involve this kind of sharing because of the social norms
associated with marriage. See id.
52
See infra notes 173-175 (more than 83% of women ages 35-44 have married and even
more women express a desire to get married.) Because getting married also involves
getting a marriage license, marriage involves governmental speech as well. In granting
the license, the state says “this relationship is worthy of the rights and obligations that we
confer on married people” Gays and lesbians fighting for the right to marry are claiming
a right to have the government legitimate their relationship too, but the arguments they
have recently used as to why the government should do so have been rooted in the
personal expressive value that marriage provides to the people who marry. See infra text
accompanying notes 70-77.
53
See infra, next paragraph. Two of the three state courts that have successfully awarded
same-sex couples the label marriage have done so as a matter of equality, not
fundamental rights theory. See Varnum v. O’Brien, 763 NW2d 862 (Iowa, 2009) and
Kerrigan v. Commisioner, 951 A.2d 707 (Ct. 2008). That is, same sex couples have been
more successful in claiming a right to the marriage label because straight couples have it
then in claiming an independent right to the label itself. California originally said there
was a fundamental right to the label marriage, but let that finding be overturned by
Proposition 8. See supra text accompanying note 2 and infra text accompanying notes
76-77. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, in the first Supreme Court decision
to mandate same-sex marriage, said that equal protection and fundamental rights analysis
were inextricably intertwined and therefore it was not important to separate them, but
Massachusetts also found that the restrictions on same-sex marriage could not pass
rational basis review. Thus, the particular constitutional doctrine was not that important.
See Goodridge v. Dpt of Pub Health, 798 NE2d 941, 961 (Mass. 2003).
54
Loving v. Virginia, 388 US 1 (1967)
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child support obligation owed to a child he had sired, while a teenager, several
years before. 55 Wisconsin law denied the right to marry to people who could
not prove that their pre-existing children were “not then and not likely thereafter
to become public charges.”56 Leonard Safely was in jail in Missouri and wanted
to get married. Prison regulations prevented him from doing so.57
The first case, Loving v. Virginia is notorious for being simultaneously
straightforward and obtuse. As a matter of equal protection doctrine, the ban on
interracial marriage was readily struck down by the Supreme Court because the
ban on interracial marriage was a transparent state endorsement of white
supremacy.58 But in the final three (very short) paragraphs of Loving, the Court
declared that marriage was protected by the Due Process Clause because it was
one of the “‘basic civil rights of man’ fundamental to our very existence and
survival.” 59 The Court then quickly put in a qualification: “to deny this
fundamental freedom [to marry] on so unsupportable a basis as the racial
classification . . . is surely to deprive . . . due process of law.”60 The first part of
this short section at the end of the Loving opinion thus seems to suggest that the
Constitution protects a right to marry because marriage is so fundamental to
existence. The subsequent line qualifies that right by suggesting that denial of the
right to marry may be permissible in some instances, but not “on so
unsupportable a basis” as race.
Eleven years after Loving, Roger Redhail applied for a marriage license and
was denied because he owed child support. As support for the idea that marriage
is a fundamental right, the majority opinion cited almost every constitutional case
having anything to do with parenting,61 procreation,62 marriage,63 or other family

55

Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 US 374 (1978).
434 US 374, 375 (1978)
57
Turner v. Safely, 482 US 78 (1987).
58
“The fact that Virginia prohibits only interracial marriages including white persons
demonstrates [the law to be] designed to maintain White Supremacy.” Loving, 388 US at
11.
59
Id. at 12, quoting Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 US 538 (1942) (the invocation of Skinner,
a case involving sterilization and thus a restriction on parenthood, is another example of
the court referring to marriage and parenthood together, as if the rights are akin to each
other, see supra text accompanying note 9 )
60
Loving 388 US at 12.
61
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 US 390 (1923) (right of parents to hire someone else to teach
children a language other than English); Pierce v. Socy of Sisters, 268 US 510 (1925)
(right of parents to send children to private school); Prince v. Mass., 321 US 158 (1943)
(state’s parens patraie interest in children must be balanced against parents’ rights to raise
children as they believe appropriate) are all cited, 434 US at 385.
62
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 404 US 438 (right of non-married people to contraception), Roe v.
Wade, 410 US 113 (right to abortion); Carey v. Population Services, 431 US 678 (same)
56
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relationships.64 For reasons the Court did not make entirely clear, the totality of
all of those cases suggested that there must be a fundamental right to marry.
When Leonard Safely wanted to get married, in jail, the Court finally felt
compelled to explain in a little more detail why the Constitution protected a right
to marry. Relying only on Zablocki for the idea that there is a fundamental right
to marry, the Court tried to explain why. Marriage is “an expression of
emotional support and public commitment.”65 It “may be an exercise of religious
faith as well as an expression of personal dedication.”66 It “is often a
precondition to the receipt of governmental benefits . . . property rights . . . and
other, less tangible benefits (e.g. the legitimation of children born out of
wedlock”).67 All of those reasons augered in favor of letting Leonard Safely
marry.
The expressive qualities of marriage, noted explicitly first by the Turner
court, have been particularly important to the constitutional treatment of same
sex marriage recently.
In Baker v. State,68 the Vermont Supreme Court
acknowledged the symbolic importance of marriage, though it curiously
determined that marriage’s symbolism was not at issue, writing that it was the
“plaintiffs claim to the secular benefits and protections of . . . [marriage] . . . that .
. . characterize[d] this case.”69 In other words, the Court determined that there

Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur, 414 US 632 (right to not be fired for being
pregnant)
63
Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 US 538 (1942) (prohibiting mandatory sterilization)
Griswald v. Connecticut, 381 US 479 (1965) (finding that married couples have a right
to privacy that includes the right to contraceptives) and Loving are all cited, 434 US at
385.
64
Smith v. OFFFER (rights of foster parents), 431 US 816 (1977); Moore v. City of East
Cleveland, 431 US 494 (1977) (rights of non-nuclear family to live together).
65
Turner v. Safley, 482 US 78, 95 (1987) (emphasis added)
66
Id. At 96 (emphasis added)
67
Id.. This last item explicitly invokes the legal incidents of marriage, not marriage’s
expressive value, though the last “benefit,” the legitimation of children, is a particularly
weak argument because for the most part, by this time, states not allowed to treat
illegitimate children differently than legitimate children, see generally IRA ELLMAN,
PAUL KURTZ, ELIZABETH SCOTT, LOIS WITHORN AND BRIAN BIX, FAMILY LAW: CASES,
TEXT, PROBLEMS (4th ed.) 1035-1038 92004) (describing the evolution of the
constitutional doctrine on illegitimate children), and legitimation could be accomplished
by simply signing a birth certificate or acknowledging paternity. See Uniform Parentage
Act, discussed infra note 91.
68
Baker v. Vermont, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999).
69
Id. At 889. It is not at all clear why the court decided that the plaintiffs were not
asking for the symbolic aspects of marriage itself. The dissent certainly thought that the
plaintiffs were asking for the symbolic aspects of marriage.

16

17

Marriage and Parenthood

[July 20, 2009]

was a an expressive component of marriage that was distinct from the panoply of
rights and benefits marriage affords.
In Goodridge v. Dept. of Public Health70 the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts highlighted the expressive aspects of marriage in granting the
right to same sex marriage. The first line of the opinion reads simply: “Marriage
is a vital social institution.”71 It noted that marriage is a function of
“community”72 and that it is “at once a deeply personal commitment to another
human being and a highly public celebration . . . . “73 No doubt, the
Massachusetts court emphasized the expressive value in order to explain why it
was going further and requiring marriage in a way that the Supreme Court of
Vermont did not in Baker.
The New Jersey plaintiffs in Lewis v. Harris74 adopted the Massachusetts
Court’s rhetoric, arguing that marriage is the “ultimate expression of love,
commitment and honor you can give to another human being.’ “[O]thers know
immediately that you have taken steps to create something special.”75 The New
Jersey Supreme Court did not deny the expressive value of marriage, but found
that it was not protected for gays and lesbians under either the substantive due
process or equal protection clauses of the New Jersey Constitution.
In In re Marriage Cases, California became the first and only state court to
find that same sex couples had a fundamental right to the marriage label. Same
sex coules already had the full panoply of Domestic Partnership rights, but the
California Supreme Court held that gays and lesbians had a fundamental right to
marry because the label marriage commanded the respect and dignity of others.76
It was because of the positive way that others view people with marital status that
the California court said marriage was a fundamental right.77
70

798 NE2d 941 (Mass. 2003)
Id. At 948 (emphasis supplied).
72
Id. (marriage is “one of our community’s most rewarding and cherished institutions”)
73
Id. At 954 (emphasis supplied)
74
908 A.2d 196 (NJ 2006).
75
Lewis v. Harris, 908 A.2d 196, 225-26 (Poritz, C.J., concurring and dissenting)
(quoting plaintiffs’ briefs)(emphasis added).
76
“[O]ne of the core elements of this fundamental right [to marry] is the right of same sex
couples to have their official family relationships accorded the same dignity, respect and
stature as that accorded to all other officially recognized family relationships.” In Re
Marriage Cases, 193 P2d at 434.
77
“The current statuses – by drawing a distinction between the name assigned to the
family relationship available to same sex couples and by reserving the historic and highly
respected designation of marriage exclusively to same sex couples . . . pose serious risk
of denying the official family relationships of same sex couples the equal respect and
dignity that is a core element of the constitutional right to marry.” Id. At 435. After
Proposition 8, the California Court decided the same sex couples still had a fundamental
71
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The idea that marriage has an important expressive dimension is also evident
from the way scholars discuss it. As David Chambers argued in his support of
gay marriage, “marriage is the single most significant communal ceremony of
belonging.” 78 Carol Sanger notes that civil marriage “is a convention that signals
an acceptance of certain obligations. It does so publicly (often ceremoniously)
and as a matter of law.”79 Cass Sunstein has argued that the right to marry counts
as fundamental only “because of the expressive benefits that come from official,
state-licensed marriage.”80
That marriage must serve some kind of expressive function becomes clear
once one looks at the history of marriage. Every state and every religious
tradition, at least for the last 600 years, has required that a witness be present at
the marriage ceremony.81 Marriage, unlike other promises that we might ask the
law to regulate, cannot be made “just” between two people. Others must be
there. One needs to find a Justice of the Peace or a judge or minister even if one
does not want a party with friends or family.
Common law marriage, the equitable legal doctrine through which courts
conferred marital status on people who cohabited and acted as if they were
married, has always required the parties to hold themselves out to the public as

right to the legal incidents of marriage, though not a fundamental right to the label itself.
See supra text accompanying note 2. In essence, the court conceded what this article
argues, which is that the right to a family status label is cabined by social norms
regarding the social meaning of that status. Proposition 8 clarified the social norms.
As mentioned, Iowa and Connecticut rooted the right to marry in equality
principles, see Varnum, 763 NW2d 862, and Kerrigan, 951 A2d, 407, which allowed the
court to speak less about the nature of marriage itself and more about discrimination.
Massachusetts did not reach the question of whether there was a fundamental right to
same sex marriage. See supra notes 19, 50
78
Chambers, supra note 48 at 450.
79
Carol Sanger, A Case for Civil Marriage, 27 CARD. L. REV. 1311,1317 (2006).
80
Sunstein, supra at 2096
81
See GEORGE P. MONGER, MARRIAGE CUSTOMS OF THE WORLD: FROM HENNA TO
HONEYMOONS,(“The most important thing (about a wedding ceremony) . . . is that it be
public;” ) Edith Turner & Pamela Frese, Marriage, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RELIGION, Vol.
8 2d 2d. (“Two elements are used to mark a marriage whether there is a ceremony or not:
the sharing of food between the bride and groom . . . and the necessity of a public
statement on the requirement of witnesses.” ) In Catholic history, the requirement that a
priest be present at the ceremony started out as a custom, but later became a requirement.
Glendon, supra note at 24. The Jewish tradition asks at least 2 or 3 witnesses to sign the
Ketubah as evidence of their witnessing the promise. Muslim ceremonies also require
witnesses. See Monger, supra this note at 170. Every state in this country requires
someone, either an agent of the state or of a religious faith or some third party specially
deputized for the task to be present at the marriage ceremony. It simply is not marriage if
there is not someone else there.
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married.82 Historian Nancy Cott entitled her comprehensive review of American
marriage, “Public Vows.”83 If marriage were only about privacy, as the Supreme
Court’s rhetoric sometimes suggests,84 than none of these public requirements
would make any sense. The ubiquitous public requirements of marriage suggest
that at some fundamental level marriage is about making a statement to others.
Expressive potential is necessarily limited by social meaning, however.
Getting married makes a statement because of what people understand marriage
to mean. Commitment is a part of that meaning, but it is not necessarily the only
part of that meaning. The totality of the social meaning of marriage is
indubitably informed by historical understanding. Marriage simply would not
mean the same thing if it were created yesterday.
Thus, to the extent that the constitution protects people’s ability to secure
marital status because marriage serves as a form of expression, that protection
must be limited by social meaning. What “others know immediately”85 about
the statement of marriage depends on what others think marriage is, and that
social understanding is not fixed. Marriage means something different today
than it did 100 years ago. To some, that contemporary meaning is clearly
capacious enough to include gay men and lesbians.86 To others, it is not.87 The
fundamental rights language in Loving suggests that interracial marriage, even if
nowhere near normative, was not inconsistent enough with the social meaning of
marriage to permit states to ban it.”88 The plaintiffs in Zablocki and Turner were
entitled to marital status because what they were claiming was a right to express
themselves through a very traditional form of marriage. As Sunstein notes, “the
expressive benefits of marriage are contingent on a particular constellation of
social norms; there is nothing inevitable about them.”
82

“[O]ne element essential to the proof of . . . [common law marriage] . . is a general and
substantial holding out or open declaration to the public . . . There can be no secret
common law marriage.” In re Estate of Dallman, 228 NW2d 187, 190 (Iowa 1975)..
83
See NANCY COTT, PUBLIC VOWS (2000).
84
In Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 US 479 (1965) the Supreme Court held that married
couples enjoy a privacy right that entitles them to use contraception.
In Part IV, I
suggest that marital privacy includes a right to be treated as an autonomous marital entity,
but in this Part I argue that the Constitution also protects a right to marriage as
expression. This right cannot be considered a privacy right because it is inherently public.
85
See supra note 75.
86
See supra note 11 (poll showing how many Americans believe that same sex couples
should be allowed to marry). See also Goodridge, supra note 22 (no rational reason to
restrict marriage to opposite sex couples)
87
Lewis v. Harris, 908 A.2d 196 (NJ 2006) (accepting the state’s right to define the
social meaning of marriage in heterosexual terms). As suggested, the voters defined the
social meaning of marriage in California when they passed Proposition 8. See supra note
77
88
Sunstein supra note 8 at 2098.
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B. Parenthood
The Supreme Court cases addressing parental status suggest that the rights of
people to secure parental status are also “contingent on a particular constellation
of social norms.”89 For the most part, parentage, like marriage, is a question of
state law. State parentage acts determine who enjoys presumptions of
parenthood (a woman giving birth to a child, for instance, or a man married to
that woman or a man listed on a birth certificate), and what procedures, if any,
exist for rebutting those presumptions.90 State law also determines when a
parent can be displaced as a parent, by whom, and when.91 For years, state
statutes have assigned paternal status in cases of artificial insemination92 and

89

Id.
Virtually all states have parentage acts establishing not only presumptions of
parenthood, but statutes of limitations for contesting those presumptions. Today, most
states allow most presumptions of parenthood to be rebutted with DNA evidence, but the
ability to do so can be limited temporally both by statutes of limitations, see e.g., Cal.
Fam Code §§ 7540-7541
(giving those who wish to challenge a presumption of
paternity two years from the discovery of relevant facts) and estoppel principles. See
Markov v. Markov, 758 A.2d 75, 81 (Md. 2000) (denying husband right to challenge
paternity because he accepted role as father despite having had a vasectomy before the
children were born); In Re Cheryl, 746 NE2d 488, 497 (Mass. 2001) (holding nonbiological father responsible for child support because he continued to fill the role of
father even after acquiring reason to believe he as not the father)
91
See Uniform Parentage Act (2002). As a preliminary indication of how complicated
parentage questions can become, the first Comment to the Act notes “[f]our separate
definitions of “father” are provided by the Act to account for the permutations of a man
who may be so classified.” The Uniform Act generally requires that claims to establish
paternity be brought within two years of the child’s birth, §607, or two years of an
acknowledgement of paternity, §609. Actions to disestablish paternity of a presumed
father may be brought at any time, but only if the presumed father never had sex with the
mother at the probable time of conception and never held himself out as father. §607.
The cases make clear that courts’ willingness to change a presumed father’s status is very
fact specific. A genetic father can sometimes displace a presumed father but not always.
A presumed father can sometimes relinquish his status if he can find the biological father
of if the biological father willingly comes forward. On the other hand, if two men are
competing for the status of father (or competing not to be the father) courts often
disregard biology altogether and use a Best Interest of the Child standard to determine
paternity. See Baker, Bargaining or Biology, supra note 38 at 12-14.
92
See e.g. Uniform Parentage Act, supra note 91, §§704, 705. Often, these statutes
distinction between formal inseminations performed by a licensed phsycian and those
performed informally. The husband of the impregnated woman is considered the father if
the insemination was done by a licenses physician, but not necessarily if it was not. See
e.g. CALIF. FAM. CODE §7613 (2003). Although there may be reasons for making this
distinction (a licensed physician lobby, for one) , it is not clear that those reasons have
90
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state statutes now routinely designate who should be considered the mother in
cases of surrogacy.93
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has recognized some constitutional right to
be declared a parent. In 1972, Peter Stanley, who had lived with his three
biological children and their mother for most of the children’s lives, challenged
an Illinois dependency statute that presumed the children to be parentless if their
unwed mother was dead.94 The Court held that the Constitution guaranteed a
man who had “sired and raised”95 his children, an opportunity to be heard before
the state could declare his children wards of the state. Thus, the Constitution
seemed to protect Stanley’s right to the legal status of father.
Several years later, Leon Quilloin tried to block the adoption of the 11 year
old child he had sired (though never lived with) using a comparable claim: The
Constitution guaranteed him rights as a father, including the right to keep
someone else from becoming the father, because Quilloin had sired the child,
periodically paid child support and seen the child on occasion.96 The Supreme
Court readily dismissed Quilloin’s claim, finding that whatever constitutional
interest Quilloin had in being a father was adequately protected at a Best Interest
of the Child hearing in which a judge found that the child’s best interest would be
served by vesting fatherhood in someone else. Quilloin was stripped of his status
as father.
A potential father named Robert Lehr tried again. He argued that the mother
of his biological two-year old girl had prevented him from developing any kind
of relationship with the girl and that fact, coupled with his biological connection
and his willingness to assume parental responsibility, should guarantee him the
right to block the child’s adoption by another man.97 The Court said no, finding
that Lehr’s failure to develop a relationship, even if it was due to the mother’s
intransigence, minimized any constitutional claim he might have. The Court
explained: “Parental rights do not spring full-blown from the biological
connection between parent and child. They require relationships more
enduring.”98 The state court was free to vest fatherhood in someone else.
much to do with protecting the interests of those whom we normally think of protecting
in parentage determinations.
93
See Institute for Law Science and Technology, The Laws of Reproductive Technology,
http/www.kentlaw.edu/islt/reprotech.html.
94
Stanley v. Illinois, 405 US 645 (1972).
95
Id, 405 US at 651.
96
Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 US 246 (1978)
97
Lehr v. Robertson, 463 US 248 (1983).
98
Id. At 260 quoting Caban v. Mohammed, 441 US 380, 397 (1979) (Stewart, J.
dissenting). Caban involved a successful claim for paternal status, though the court
decided the case as a matter of sex discrimination. Mr. Caban was trying to block the
adoption of his children by another man, but what distinguished him from Quilloin was
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In 1989, Michael H. seemed poised to capitalize on the idea that one’s
constitutional right to status as father turned on the twin requirements of biology
plus relationship. Michael H. could establish that he was the biological father of
a child, Victoria, whom he had lived with from time to time, who called him
Daddy, and whom he had supported (though others had as well) throughout her
life. The Court nontheless rejected Michael’s assertion that he had a
constitutional right to be declared the father, finding that the state was free to vest
paternal status in the husband of the biological mother, who had also supported
Victoria, who was still married to the mother and who was willingly accepting
paternity. The California statute at issue embodied a centuries old marital
presumption of paternity.99 Thus, the Court held that the Constitution did not
stand in the way of the state conferring parental status on the husband of the
mother in the same way it always had.100
The potential fathers in these parenthood cases probably wanted more than
just status. They wanted the rights, and maybe even the obligations, that
accompany parental status.101 It is important to underscore though, that
particularly at the time these cases were decided, most of these men would have
gotten minimal visitation time with their children and no right to major parental
decision-making.102 Judges routinely gave the vast amount of custodial time and

that he had developed a much more extensive relationship with his children. Given that
relationship between father and children, the Supreme Court held that the mother and
father were similarly situated and that therefore the adoption statute could not treat
mothers and fathers differently for purposes of securing their consent to adoption. The
Lehr court’s subsequent decision strongly suggests that the relationship Mr. Caban
developed with his children strengthened a constitutionally protected liberty interest in
his children as well as his equal protection claim. See Lehr, 463 US at 267-268
(describing how a father’s actual relationship with his child strengthens his liberty
interest in paternal status for due process purposes and makes him similarly situated to
the mother for equal protection purposes).
99
See Baker, Bargaining or Biology, supra note 38 at 22-25 (analyzing the strength of
and rationale behind the marital presumption of paternity.)
100
As noted in the introduction, though, Justice Stevens, the swing vote, opted against
giving Michael the right to parental status because the California statute already
provided interested third parties (including Michael) a right to petition for the rights
traditionally associated with parenthood. In other words, Justice Stevens thought
Michael was entitled to the rights of parenthood, but not necessarily the status. 491 US
133-134 (Stevens, J. concurring in the judgment)
101
Comparably, the plaintiffs in Loving, Zablocki and Turner, see supra text
accompanying notes 59-64, probably wanted the rights (and maybe the obligations) of
marriage, not just the status.
102
The exception to this is Stanley, who, because there was no other parent at the time he
petitioned, would have enjoyed exclusive parental rights.
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all major decision-making authority to the custodial parent.103 Most of what
these men were fighting for was the right to be called a father. That parental
status entitled one to exclude someone else from having the label father, but little
else substantively. Thus, it seems likely that these men cared so much about the
label father not because of the rights that accompanied it, but because the label
itself had social value and social meaning.
Quilloin, Lehr and Michael H. all suggest limits on the scope of any
constitutional right to parental status, but they also all take the question seriously.
That is to say, none of them suggest that Stanley was wrongly decided and none
of them simply state that the state is free to confer parental status on whomever it
wants, free from any constitutional constraint on the definition of parenthood. In
a thoughtful essay, Professor David Meyer has suggested that this limited, though
probably existent, constitutional protection of parental status may be analogous
to the constitutional treatment of property.104 The Constitution forbids states
from taking property105 even as it gives states the extensive discretion to define
it.106
Virtually everyone concedes that states have the ability to modify the
requirements of adverse possession or adopt a different rule for ground water use
or tinker with the Rule Against Perpetuities, even though all of those changes
affect property rights.107 Comparably, few people question the state’s ability to
honor, or not, surrogacy contracts, to recognize, or not, second-parent

103

See L. HARRIS, L. TEITELBAUM, J. CARBONE, FAMILY LAW 622-23 (“When the bestinterest standard first took hold, the courts were convinced that custody needed to be
awarded to one, and only one parent. . . [T]he participation of the other parent . . .
depended on the cooperation of the custodial parent. Certainty in decision-making
authority was considered essential.”); ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 34 at § 2.08 cmt. a
(“Traditionally, one parent received custody of a child . . . while the other parent was
awarded visitation. Visitation . . . [was] . . . often quite minimal.”)
104
David D. Meyer, Partners, Care Givers, and the Constitutional Substance of
Parenthood, in RECONCEIVING THE FAMILY, supra note 43 at 47, 61.
105
U.S. Const., Amendment V.
106
“Property interests are not created by the Constitution, ‘they are created and their
dimensions are divined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent
source such as state law.’” Cleveland Bd. Of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 US 532, 538
(1985) quoting Bd. Of Regents v. Roth, 408 US 564, 577 (1972). See also Jeremy Paul,
The Hidden Structure of Takings Law, 64 S. CAL. L. REV. 1393, 1402, 1415 (1991)
(Property rights serve “twin roles – as protector of individual rights against other citizens,
and as safeguard against excessive government interference.” “To reconcile American
Law’s double-edged reliance on property concepts, [we] must successfully distinguish
between the courts’ role as definers and defenders of property rights.”
107
See JOSEPH SINGER, PROPERTY LAW: RULES, POLICIES AND PRACTICEs 953-54 (4th ed.,
2006)
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adoption,108 to determine, for the most part, who is entitled to parental status.
This does not mean that states have the right to redefine property or parenthood
beyond social recognition, however. Just as community expectations, or the
social meaning of property, help set limits on state’s ability to expand or contract
property interests,109 “social expectations about the nature of parenthood are
likely to apply a constitutional brake on state-law efforts to withdraw and
reassign parent status.”110
C. Summary
Social expectations about the nature of marriage and parenthood inform the
constitutional inquiry with regard to those statuses. Both marital and parental
status bring with them rights and obligations, but the statuses have meaning apart
from those rights and obligations. People claiming a right to marital or parental
status are claiming a right to have their relationship understood by others in
certain commonly understood ways. In granting family status, the state itself
expresses something (that this is a relationship worthy of state-conferred
status),111 but it also enables the recipients of the status to proclaim to the world
their unique relationship to another person. The analysis of marriage, which is
perhaps more readily seen as expression, helps elucidate how claims to parental
status are expressive claims also.
Expressive claims to status are necessarily cabined by the social meaning of
that status, but nontraditional relationships can put pressure on and force courts
to confront that social meaning. Loving recognized the legitimacy of a still very
rare form of marriage and Stanley recognized the legitimacy of unwed
fatherhood, an even more suspect form of parenthood then than it is now. In each
case, though, the courts found that the plaintiffs were entitled to call themselves,
respectively, “married” and “parent,” notwithstanding the wide discretion that
states have to determine access to and the substantive requirements of marriage
and parenthood.

IV. THE CONSTITUTIVE RIGHT TO RELATIONSHIP
The legal incidents of marriage and parenthood provide those with rights to
them some well-known legal advantages. One gets to visit one’s family member
108

Second parent adoption is the term of art used to describe adoption by two parents of
the same gender. It is called “second parent” adoption because, usually, a new parent is
adopting without any former parent relinquishing parental rights. See Sharon S. v.
Superior Ct, 73 P2d 554 n.10 (Cal. 2003).
109
See Thomas W. Merrill, The Landscape of Constitutional Property, 86 VA. L. REV
885, 939 (2000) (Supreme Court’s protection of property deeply informed by “general
expectations about kinds of interests that are commonly regarded as being property in our
society.” )
110
Meyer, Partners, supra note 104 at 62.
111
See supra note 52.
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in the hospital. If needed, one gets to make decisions on behalf of one’s family
member. One gets to inherit one’s family member’s property if the family
member dies intestate. There are many benefits attendant upon securing the legal
incidents of marriage and parenthood, but those legal incidents can also be seen
as thoroughly restrictive.
These are the kind of constraints the law imposes on married people. One
loses control over approximately 50% of all the earnings one brings to the
marriage.112 One significantly curtails one’s ability to pursue any nonremunerative life activity, if in so pursuing, one would be unable to meet future
support obligations to one’s spouse.113 One loses the right to mortgage any
property held in tenancy by the entirety, unless one’s spouse agrees. One loses
the right to petition a court to enforce many explicit and implicit agreements
between one’s spouse and oneself, particularly if those agreements pertained to
duties thought intrinsic to the marriage.114 One also often loses the right to keep
inherited property if that property was used by both parties to the marriage.115
One loses the right to testify in court about what one has heard, if one’s spouse

112

In non-community property states, this is not technically true because the property is
not conceived of as “marital property” until the divorce proceeding, but, at divorce,
whether in a community property or equitable distribution regime, all earnings earned
during the course of the marriage are considered property subject to distribution at
divorce. See ELLMAN ET AL., supra note 67 at 270-276. Most jurisdictions divide marital
property approximately evenly at divorce, id., though sometimes the primary wage earner
or the spouse with access to more other resources is left with significantly less than 50%
of the marital property. See In Re Marriage of Pierson, 653 P.2d 1258 (Or. 1982) (wife
got less than 50% of the marital property because she came into an inheritance after the
couple had split.)
113
All states provide for some spousal maintenance in some instances. After some
movement away from substantial spousal maintenance awards in the 1970s and 80s, the
current trend is toward more substantial maintenance awards. See generally, ALI
PRINCIPLES, supra note 34, Chapter 5 .
114
Balfour v. Balfour, L.R. 2 K.B. 571 (C.A. 1919) (most agreements between husband
and wife are not meant to be enforceable at law); Borelli v. Brousseau, 16 Cal. Rptr. 16
(Cal. App. 1993) (refusing to enforce a promise to leave more money for spouse because
for lack of consideration because wife’s promise to care for and support her husband was
part of her marital duty); see generally, Jill Elaine Hasday, Intimacy and Economic
Exchange, 119 Harv. L. Rev. 492 (2005) (law does not compensate women for work
performed in marriage).
115
In some community property states, inherited property is considered marital property.
See HARRIS, TEITELBAUM supra note 103 at 48. Many equitable distribution states treat
any commingled property as marital property. For instance, in Illinois “ the affirmative
act of augmenting nonmarital property by commingling it with marital property” creates a
presumption that the nonmarital (inherited) property is subject to distribution as marital
property. See In re Marriage of Smith, 427 NED 2d 1239, 1245-46 (Ill. 1981).
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said it.116 In some states, one loses the right to sue one’s spouse in tort,
particularly if the tort was unintentional.117 Given this formidable – and not
even complete – list of restrictions on one’s autonomy, one might question why
so many people are clamoring for the right to get married.118
The obligations the state imposes on parents are less numerous, but arguably
stricter and more onerous. Once one is a legal parent, one simply loses the right
to walk away from that relationship unless the state and the other parent
agrees.119 One cannot unilaterally divorce one’s child. A parent is obligated to
support his or her child until the child is at least 18 years old. If one is a
custodial parent – regardless of how the other parent left – one is responsible for
physically caring for the child. Failure to do so is a criminal offense.120 If one is
a non-custodial parent, one loses the right to allocate one’s resources for one’s
children as one chooses. In all states, parental support obligations are set
116

The spousal communications privilege treats as privileged any communication made
in confidence from one spouse to another as long as the spouses are not accusing the
other of wrongdoing. See GEORGE FISHER, EVIDENCE 839-841 (2002). Most
jurisdictions extend the privilege to both the communicator and the listener, meaning that
the either spouse can bar the other from revealing marital confidences. Id.
117
For a comprehensive discussion of the state of interspousal tort immunity, see Carl
Tobias, Interspousal Tort Immunity in America, 23 Ga L Rev 359 (1989).
118
The idea that the acceptance of pre-nuptial agreements allows most of these
obligations to be overridden by private contract is much exaggerated. The Uniform
Premarital Agreement Act, adopted in the early 1980s suggested that premarital
agreements should be interpreted like other commercial contracts, but many courts and
the recent ALI PRINCIPLES soundly reject that standard, advocating instead some sort of
review under the traditional unconscionability standard and/or procedural protections.
See Ellman et al., supra note 67 at 737-766. Unconscionability is defined with reference
to what the spouse would be entitled to under the state marital property distribution rules.
Perhaps most persuasive to this author are comments relayed to me one day over lunch,
by a practicing family law attorney in Chicago. He said “I don’t know a family law
attorney who doesn’t think he can beat any prenup he sees.” (Comments of Joel Levin,
June, 2007). Even if this statement exaggerates the situation somewhat, it suggests that
there are significant and possibly insurmountable costs and roadblocks to contracting
around the background marital property distribution rules.
119
One cannot effectively relinquish parental rights (put the child up for adoption) unless
the other parent relinquishes also. If one legal parent wants to be a parent and the other
parent does not, the first parent still has the right to hold the second parent responsible for
child support. See Baker, Bionormativity, supra note 37. Once the child is old enough,
even if both parents want to relinquish parental rights, it is highly unlikely the state would
accept their relinquishment because it is highly unlikely the child could be adopted.
120
The first parent to abandon a child is not charged with neglect as long as there is
someone else to provide for the child. But if the “last parent standing” exercises similar
agency, he or she is charged with abandonment and neglect. ELLMAN ET AL, supra note
67 at 1127-1139 (discussing general provisions for civil and criminal child abuse and
neglect proceedings) .
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pursuant to rigid guidelines which allocate resources to the child based on a
percentage of what the non-custodial parent earns.121
The constitutionally
protected parental “`right to the companionship, care, custody and management
of . . . children [may be] . . . an interest far more precious than any property
right,”122 but there seems much in the law of parenthood that is detrimental to
parents’ autonomy and property interests.
Why do people care so much about entering into these statuses in which they
compromise so much liberty and property? It is not just because of the
expressive value that comes from making these commitments. To put it in
economic terms, it is not just because when one weighs the benefits of the
expressive utils, against the negative utility associated with the restrictions on
autonomy and property, one still comes out ahead. It is instead because the
restrictions on autonomy and property inform and enrich the relationships
involved, thus providing their own form of positive utility. The legal incidents of
marriage and parenthood, though sometimes harsh and restrictive, give meaning
and content to those relationships and make them, hopefully, independent sources
of happiness, autonomy and identity. Thus, the legal restrictions which so
obviously inhibit individuals’ ability to shape their own lives as individuals help
create relationships through which people (re)constitute themselves as something
other than individuals.
A. The Law and the Importance of the Adult Relationships
1. Marriage as Constitutive
Contrary to the once popular slogan suggesting that people need relationships
the way fish need bicycles,123 it is by now conventional psychological wisdom
that “[p]eople are constructed in such a fashion that they are inevitably and
powerfully drawn together . . . wired for intense and persistent involvements with
one another.”124 Most of the pre-eminent latter 20th century psychoanalytic
theorists constructed and worked within paradigms that assumed the primacy of
relationship.125 The foundational work of both Ronald Fairbairn and John
121

See Katharine K. Baker, Supporting Children, Balancing Lives, 34 PEPP. L. REV. 359,
362-363 (2007)(explaining child support guidelines).
122
Santosky v. Kramer, 455 US 745, 758 (1982) (quoting Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. at
651).
123
“ A woman needs a man as much as a fish needs a bicycle.” None of the relational
theory analyzed in the forthcoming paragraphs suggests that heterosexual attachment is
necessary, only that attachment is necessary. Individuals need to exist in relationship
much more than fish need bicycles. Who those relationships are with may not matter that
much at all.
124
STEPHEN MITCHELL, RELATIONAL CONCEPTS IN PSYCHOANALYSIS: AN INTEGRATION
22 (1988)
125
Object-relations theory, upon which much of the following argument is based, was
originally shunned by the American Psychoanalytic Association, but later was
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Bowlby rested on the notion that one of, if not the, central human motivation is
finding and maintaining strong emotional bonds.126 Libido, in the words of
Fairbairn, is “primarily object-seeking” not pleasure seeking. ”127 Law professor
Kenneth Karst puts it in less technical language, “to be human is to need to love
and be loved.”128 Seeking relationships is a critical part of what human beings
do. In turn, those relationships become a critical part of who human beings are.
That the law, particularly constitutional law, has seemed somewhat confused
about the importance of relationship is not particularly surprising. Most liberal
and social contract theory assumes that human beings are ontologically
autonomous.129 Isolated individualism is thought to be the primal human state,
and the Bill of Rights was arguably drafted to protect people’s ability to maintain
their distinctive individual identity free from state interference. 130
From a
social contract perspective, people can be legally situated in relationship with
others and develop obligations to those others only because those people
consented to those relationships and obligations.131
At some exceedingly broad level, one can characterize both marriage and
parenthood as choices in this way – one consents to be married for better or
worse and one assumes the risk of onerous burdens when one becomes a parent but choice is a remarkably thin way to describe how most people experience their
familial obligations. One does not choose to take care of a permanently disabled
spouse or choose to love an obstinate, rude and disloyal child; one just does it. It
is more instinctive than chosen precisely because one is not just an individual
who made commitments that may or may not have been chosen. Instead, one is
part of a unit. As George Fletcher writes, when it comes to explaining one’s

incorporated into psychoanalytic thinking. See PETER FONAGY, ATTACHMENT THEORY
AND PSYCHOANALYSIS
126
MITCHELL, supra note 124 at 23-29
127
Ronald Fairbain, An Object-relations Theory of the Personality 84 (1952). See also
id, at 31 (“The ultimate goal of the libido is the object . . . )The notion that the human
desire for sex is related to the human desire for relationship could have important
implications for understanding why and the extent to which the constitution protects
sexual experience. See Ian Ayres and Katharine K. Baker, A Separate Crime of Reckless
Sex 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 599, 662 (2005) (arguing that when it has protected sexual
activity, the Supreme Court has been careful to define that activity as an important
element of expression within a relationship, not a protected activity in and of itself)
128
Kenneth Karst, The Freedom of Intimate Association, 89 YALE L. J. 624, 632 (1980).
129
For a discussion of how both liberal and critical legal theorists conceptualize the self
as ontologically autonomous see Robin West, Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U. Chi. L.
Rev. 1, 14-15 (1988) .
130
NANCY HIRSCHMAN, RETHINKING OBLIGATION: FEMINIST METHOD FOR POLITICAL
THEORY 5 (1992).
131
Id.
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primal loyalties, “logic runs dry and one must plant one’s loyalty in the simple
fact [of belonging.]”132
One meets others’ needs in family relationships because the interdependence
that demarcates family obfuscates one’s sense of self. In Fletcher’s language
“the distance between subject and object” is blurred.133 Milton Regan writes that
individuals core attachments “are not externally related to their self-conceptions.
They are constituent of their identities and . . . premises for their agency.”134
Karst comments that “our intimate associations are powerful influences over the
development of our personalities.”135 Loyalties and duties to the other are not
something that one has earned or that one owes or that one chooses to accept,
they are a matter of self-interest because the self and the other have become
one.136
The choice to enter a relationship is thus not just an expression about who
one wants to be with, it is a choice that alters who one is.137 It is constitutive as
well as expressive.138 Moreover, as Regan suggests “spouses . . . don’t simply
help each other construct separate individual identities . . . [T]hey participate in
the creation of a shared identity.”139 When the law recognizes marriage, the
shared identity created by the relationship comes to have a legal status – an
autonomy - of its own.
As a matter of doctrine, the Supreme Court has recognized this form of
marital autonomy only once, in Griswold v. Connecticut – when it a articulated a

132

GEORGE FLETCHER, LOYALTY 61 (Here Fletcher it talking about the experience of
loyalty generally. When discussing spouses in particular, he suggests that the marital
evidentiary privileges essentially operate as privileges against self-incrimination because
the distance between the object and the subject becomes so blurred that hurting oen’s
spouse is hurting oneself. Id. At 81).
133
Id.
134
MILTON REGAN, ALONE TOGETHER : LAW AND THE MEANINGS OF MARRIAGE 24
(1998).
135
Karst, supra note 128 at 636.
136
See LAURENCE D. HOULGATE, FAMILY AND STATE 39 (1988) (describing solicitude
not as something that he owes his family members but as instinctive obligation) See also,
MILTON REGAN, FAMILY LAW AND THE PURSUIT OF INTIMACY 113 (1993) (one dives into
to save a drowning child (or spouse) as much to serve one’s own interest as the other’s.)
137
Or at least it can alter who one is and, for relationships that do work out, it does alter
who one is.
138
For more on the constitutive aspects of accepting responsibility, see Meir Dan-Cohen,
Responsibility and the Boundaries of the Self, 105 HARV. L. REV. 959 (1992) (developing
the constitutive responsibility paradigm and suggesting that a person’s responsibilities
define who a person is)
139
REGAN, FAMILY LAW supra note 136 at 94.
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right to marital privacy that allowed married couples to use contraceptives.140 In
Griswold, the court famously wrote:
Marriage is a coming together for better or for worse, hopefully
enduring and intimate to the degree of being sacred. It is an association
that promotes a way of life, not causes; a harmony in living, not
political faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not commercial or social projects.
Yet it is an association for as noble a purpose as any involved in our
prior decisions.141

Seven years later, in Eisenstadt v. Baird142 when the court found that unmarried
individuals also had a right to contraceptives, Justice Brennan suggested that
marital autonomy might not exist at all. “[T]he marital couple is not an
independent entity with a mind and heart of its own, but an association of two
individuals each with a separate intellectual and emotional makeup.”143
There is very little way to square this individualistic language in Eisenstadt
with the notions of unity in Griswold.144 Technically, one need not do so because
subsequent cases strongly suggest there is an individual right to be free from
state interference into reproductive decision-making (a right that would attach to
the plaintiffs in both Eisenstadt and Griswold).145 But if Griswold is nothing
more than a case about contraception, it would make no sense to quote it, as the
Supreme Court has consistently done, in the later cases having to do with family
relationships in general and marriage in particular.146 Moreover, there is a long,
140

381 US 479, 484 (1965). In finding a right to marital privacy, the Court relied heavily
on cases that afforded privacy to the relationship between parents and children, Meyer v.
Nebraska 262 US 390 (1923) (state cannot prohibit parents from hiring someone to teach
their children a language other than English) Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 US 510
(1925) (state cannot require children to attend public school if there is an adequate private
alternative).
141
381 US at 486.
142
405 US 438 (1972) (Eisenstadt involved state restrictions on the distribution of
contraceptives to unmarried people.)
143
405 US at 453.
144
See supra note 76.
145
See Roe v. Wade, 410 US 113 (1973) (restricting the state’s ability to prohibit
abortion); Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 US 52 (1976) (striking down required
spousal notification before abortion decision); Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 US 833
(1992) (“Our law affords constitutional protection to personal decisions relating to
marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationship, child rearing . . . “)
146
See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 US 645, 651 (1972) (involving the right to paternal status,
citing Griswold); Smith v. OFFER, 431 US 110, 123 (1977) (involving the constitutional
rights of foster parents, citing Griswold); Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 US 494,
495 (1977) (involving the rights of extended family members to be treated as a family,
citing Griswold); Zablocki v. Redhail, supra note 55, 434 at 385 (right to marry, citing
Griswold); See also In Re Marriage Cases, supra note 1, 49 Cal Rptr 3d at 715 (right to
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deep and venerable common law history of treating the marital unit as an entity,
with an autonomy of its own.147 Justice Brennan completely ignored this wellestablished law in suggesting that married people do not constitute a unit. The
law has always treated married people as an entity for economic, evidentiary, and
other legal purposes. 148 In Martha Fineman’s words, the doctrine “articulate[s] .
. . what might be characterized as an ethic or ideology of family privacy,”149
which she goes on to re-articulate as autonomy.
The autonomous treatment the law affords relationships enables a universe,
or at least a community, that serves as a buffer against the outside world.
“When we come home to our families,” writes Laurence Houlgate “we return to a
relationship of intimacy, defined by conditions of mind, not overt action, by
trusts and devotion, instead of formal rules and duty.”150 The abstract and
formalistic relationships that define most peoples’ non-family life leave us
searching for relationships that operate differently. Families provide those
relationships by “emphasizing ‘shared commitment’ rather than rules.”151
In her analysis of Americans’ understanding of fairness, Jennifer Hochschild
observes that norms of distribution and desert vary in different realms.152 In the
socializing domain (which she describes as family, school, and friends) norms of
equality and need predominate. What one is entitled to (love, care, even material
goods, sometimes) depends not on what one has accomplished or what one
promised, but simply on the fact that one is a member of that domain. Indeed,
marry, citing Griswold); Goodridge v. Dept. of Pub Health, supra note 7, 798 NE2d at
955 (right to marry, citing Griswold).
147
McGuire v. McGuire is the most famous case. 59 NWd 336 (Neb. 1953). In McGuire,
the Nebraska court refused to find justiciable a wife’s claim to a higher living standard
even though it was clear that the couple could afford to live more comfortably.
148
The legal treatment of the marital relationship has been subject to severe criticism by
feminists, see Reva Siegal, “The Rule of Love:” Wife Beating as Prerogative and
Privacy, 105 YALE L. J 2117, 2161-2170 (notion of marital unity emerged to bar women
from suing their husbands even as the common law evolved to allow married women to
sue others in tort and contract.) Siegal refers the ways in which the law maintains
traditional coverture principles that rob married women of their rights as individuals as
“preservation through transformation.” Id. at 2121. See also Katharine B. Silbaugh,
Turning Labor into Love: Housework and the Law, 91 NORTHWESTERN L. REV. 1,
(1996) (demonstrating how the law views women’s labor as intrinsic to the marital
relationship, not as an independent source of entitlement.) Part IIIB2 elaborates on the
feminist critique of marriage.
149
Martha Fineman, What Place for Family Privacy, 67 GEO WASH L REV 1207, 1215
(1999)
150
HOULGATE supra note 136 at 35.
151
Karst, supra note 128 at 639.
152
Jennifer Hocschild, What’s Fair: American Beliefs About Redistributive Justice 4750 (1981).
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psychological literature suggests that “promoting an ‘exchange orientation’ may
be inimical to the process of establishing intimacy. It leads people to monitor
their partners and keep running accounts in a way that makes momentary
violations [too] salient. . . . .”153 It is being in the family, not what one does in
the family that determines entitlement, just as it is being in the family, not what
one has promised, that determines obligation.154 The strength of the familial
norms of entitlement explain how family can operate as such a haven. One is
entitled because one is of the family. One need not prove anything.
The law honors these alternative norms of entitlement by leaving the families
alone while in tact and by emphasizing membership not contribution at
dissolution. As Fineman writes, the “ideology of state non-intervention is rooted
in idealization, but also references the perceived pragmatics of family
relationships and the acknowledged limitations of legal . . . systems as substitutes
for family decision-making.”155 By refusing to import its own rules, the law
encourages parties to work things out on their own, to forge their own sense of
purpose as an entity, and to develop norms that facilitate their lives together. The
process of working it out bolsters a sense of intimacy precisely because the
abstract and formalistic rules of law have no relevance. There are no universal
truths for relationships.156

153

John G. Holmes and Susan D. Boon, Developments in the Field of Close
Relationships: Creating Foundations for Intervention Strategies, 16 PERS SOC PSYCHOL
BULL 23, 27 (1990). See also Lenahan O’Connell, An Exploration of Exchange in Three
Social Relationships: Kinship, Friendship and the Marketplace, 1 J. OF SOC AND PERS
RELAT. 333, 341-342 (1984) (finding no reciprocity norm in exchanges between kin
members and close friends. “Many believe that friendship and kinship bestow a license
to request help without imposing any imperative obligation to reciprocate.”)
154
The familial norm of entitlement is very different than one’s sense of entitlement in
more public spheres. Hochschild suggests that inequality norms are acceptable and even
preferable in the market domain, where there is an acceptable theory of desert that
explains disparity. HOCHSCHILD, supra note 152 at 49. Equality is the operative norm in
the political realm, but it is not material or emotional goods that are distributed in that
realm, it is political rights. (To the extent that one asks Americans to view economic
rights as political rights, they usually deny or transform the hypothetical. Id. At 48).
Law plays a huge role in constructing the theories of desert in the market domain and in
constructing the nature of the participatory rights in the political realm, but it plays much
of less of a role in the social domain. It defines the social domain and then usually lets
distributions within that domain work themselves out, until parties within the domain call
on the law to interfere, i.e. at divorce or termination of parental rights.
155
Fineman, supra note 149 at 1214.
156
As Hillary Clinton commented at a time when the entire world was looking at her
marriage through a microscope and wondering how it could possibly work, “I have
learned a long time ago that the only people who count in any marriage are the two
people that are in it.” Maureen Downey, Saturday Talk. THE ATLANTA JOURNAL AND
CONSTITUTION, Jan. 31, 1998.
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The intimacy and trust of family relationships, an intimacy and trust born
from sharing not only day-to-day life, but also the “distinctly personal aspects of
one’s life”157 create “attachments and commitments”158 that the law honors by
making exit difficult and by refusing to interfere in most day-to-day life.159
These restrictions are simultaneously taxing and liberating. “Bonds of lasting
intimacy leave family members undeniably vulnerable, but the same relationships
and loyalties that seem to tie us down are, paradoxically, the sources of strength
most likely to lift us up.”160
The law’s treatment of relationships thus privileges the entity over the
individual. Through property rules161 explicit statutes,162and common law
duties,163 the law sets norms not just for sharing, but for fusing, for making it
difficult for individuals to think about their property or their needs as distinct
from those of their partners. In setting these norms, the law facilitates the
fulfillment what may be core - or at least a widely held - human needs to
transcend self in the context of relationship.
When legal relationships dissolve and the law does get involved in
distributing financial assets, courts do not focus on particular individual
contributions or needs, at least if the relationship has been relatively long-lasting.
For the most part, courts distribute all property earned during the marriage
evenly, regardless of who earned it.164 With regard to maintenance, the divorce
reforms in the 1970s and 1980s endorsed the idea of making maintenance a

157

Roberts v. United States Jaycees,468 US 609, 619-20 (1984).
Id. Regan also suggests that trust flows from the intimacy of day to day life. “Trust
“can flow out of the progress of a relationship with another, as daily experience
incrementally and almost imperceptibly creates a milieu in which persons come to trust
each other. . . . “ REGAN, ALONE TOGETHER, supra note 134 at 25
159
The refusal to interfere, as manifested in the spousal immunity doctrines, the
evidentiary privileges and the common law doctrine of non-interference, see McGuire v.
McGuire, supra note 147, is a common law, not a constitutional doctrine. It operates in
much the same way as the constitutional doctrine of parental autonomy does though. See
infra part IVB1.
160
Bruce C. Hafen, The Family as an Entity, 22 U.C. DAVIS L. REV 865, 912 (1989).
161
See infra note 164-66.
162
See e.g. Cal. Civil Code §5132 “A married person shall support the person’s spouse
while they are living together, “ § 4802 “a husband and wife cannot, by any contract with
each other, alter their legal relationship, except a to property . . . “.
163
For instance, the necessaries doctrine requires a spouse, if able, to pay for another
spouse’s “necessaries.” See ELLMAN ET AL, supra note 67 at 159-161.
164
At divorce, all property earned during the marriage is considered either community
property (in community property states) or marital property (in common law
jurisdictions). See HARRIS, TEITELBAUM AND CARBONE, supra note 34 at 98-40.
158
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function of individual need or contribution,165 but recent judicial and statutory
trends have rejected these reforms as inimical to the idea of marriage and shifted
the emphasis to the length of the marriage (the amount of time of belonging) not
individual sacrifice or entitlement. 166 In other words, whatever one contributed
or did as a spouse, if one was married for long enough, one is entitled to
maintenance. It is the fact of belonging that matters.167
2. Marriage as Oppressive?
This noble and psychological story about how and why the law respects
relationship has thus far (purposefully) neglected to mention how very
devastating the traditional treatment of relationship has been for many women,
notwithstanding property and maintenance laws designed to protect them
somewhat. As Lee Teitelbaum recognized over 20 years ago, “[w]hen courts
refuse to resolve . . . [intra-family] disputes, that decision is sounded on the
principle of family autonomy . . . . [H]owever, the practical consequence of
many, if not all, of these decisions is to confer or ratify the power of one family
member over others.168
Despite the reciprocal rights and obligations that the
law imposed on husbands and wives, for hundreds of years, it was all too clear
that the refusal of the law to interfere let a man abandon or ignore his obligations
to his spouse and/or use force against his wife if he thought that, for any reason,
she was ignoring her obligations.169 Because women had so few options in life

165

See ELLMAN ET AL, supra note 67 at 363-364 (discussing “reforms” in alimony laws)
and at 380-386 (discussing the problems with the rationales that alimony “reform” relied
on) .
166
See id. at 386 “Marital duration appears to be a critical factor for nearly every court
asked to make an award for ‘support alimony’ – alimony with no definite termination
date that is intended to provide the obligee with a more comfortable living standard.” .
See also ALI PRINCIPLES supra note 34, § 5.04 Cmt. C “Despite the conceptual
difficulties with the contract and contribution rationales, the cases reflect an enduring
intuition that the homemaker in a long-term marriage has some claim on the other
spouse’s post-divorce income. That intuition does not depend on any assumption that the
parties made explicit promises to one another, but on the belief that the relationship itself
gives rise to obligations. . . . The remedy is proportional to the marital duration because
the obligations recognized under this section do not arise from the marriage ceremony
alone, but develop over time as the parties’ lives become entwined.”
167
Comparably, child support awards are set pursuant to rigid statutory grids as a way of
preventing judges from making individual assessments about children’s needs or desires.
What a child is entitled to is a function of the fact of her legal relationship to her parent,
not as a function of her particular situation. See Baker, Bargaining or Biology, supra
note 38 at 7-8.
168
See Lee Teitelbaum, Family History and Family Law, 1985 Wis. L Rev. 1135, 1144.
169
See Elizabeth Schneider, The Violence of Privacy 23 CONN. L. REV. 973 (1991)
(analyzing the myriad ways that privacy doctrine has allowed men to control and abuse
women in marriage).
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outside of marriage, they were completely dependent on the largesse of their
husbands within it.
The fact that for centuries marriage has served as an institution that allowed
the law to subordinate women’s property interests and ignore women’s physical
and emotional well-being might well auger in favor of constitutional suspicion of
marriage, not reification of it. One could easily argue that the equality principles
embedded in the Equal Protection Clause require the law to scrutinize the ways
in which the law privileges relationship precisely because, as Teitelbaum
observed, by privileging relationships the law privileges the more powerful at the
expense of the less powerful and thereby denies the less powerful full voice and
participation in society.
Furthermore, the legal recognition of marriage may not be that important to
women because they are already more likely to experience life as a web of
connection to others. Women may not need marriage because they do not crave
intimacy the way men do;170 as Robin West writes, “We just do it. It is
ridiculously easy.”171 Perhaps, when the Supreme Court has referred to the
human flourishing that marriage enables,172 it has been seeing the world through
a distinctly male lens, and whatever values may be served by fostering the
intimacy of marriage, those values pale in comparison to the equality concerns
that seem antithetical to it.
Reasonable minds may well disagree on this question. The contemporary
empirical evidence continues to show that the vast majority of women marry,173
even more women express a desire to marry,174 and those women who do marry
170

See Katharine K. Baker, Property Rules Meet Feminist Needs: Respecting Autonomy
by Valuing Connection, 59 OHIO ST. L J 1523, 1549-1558 (1998) (describing how the
traditional justifications for the treatment of marriage ignore the substantial feminist
literature that suggests that women may crave and need formalism and independence not
altruism and intimacy because caring and connection seem to come so much more easily
to women) Even if this is true, however, women may still support state-sponsored
marriage because they recognize that the traditional legal treatment of relationship helps
men overcome a more individualistic outlook toward life. See Baker, id. 1595 (“wives
may benefit from the extent to which legal protection of marriage encourages their
husbands to become more caring, intimate, and selfless.”)
171
West, supra note 127 at 18.( “Intimacy is not something which women fight to
become capable of. We just do it. It is ridiculously easy.”) The gendered facility with
intimacy may explain why, historically, marriage has been more psychologically
beneficial to men. See generally STEVEN NOCK, MARRIAGE IN MEN’S LIVES (1998).
172
See Griswold, supra note 141.
173
U.S. Census, S2201, 2006 American Community Survey. Of women over age 15,
only 27.3% are never married. Of women between the ages of 35-44, only 16.4% are
never married.
174
Polling Nations, questions to 13-24 year olds, 52 % definitely want to get married and
40% probably want to get married. http://poll.orspub.com .
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are happier, healthier and wealthier than those who do not. 175 To be sure, there
are endogeneity concerns with this data. Marriage may make people happier,
healthier and wealthier, but happy, healthy and wealthy people are probably more
likely to marry.176 Moreover, state policies and norms supporting marriage help
explain why married people would feel happier (they are comporting with a
social norm), healthier (they have easier access to health insurance) and wealthier
(they get preferable tax treatment).177 Maybe the only reason women want to
marry is because they will be considered normal and get access to health care and
tax benefits. After all, there are numerous women who cherish their “emotional
individualism”178 and flourish both psychologically and materially outside the
confines of marriage. Maybe if the state stopped supporting marriage, women
would run from it.
Maybe. But at times it seems as if the feminist critique of marriage is
running into the same road block that the feminist critique of sexuality did.179
For much of the 1980s feminism consistently emphasized how women’s
175

Steven Nock writes “The many beneficial effects of marriage are well-known. Married
people are generally healthier; they live longer, earn more, have better health and better
sex lives, and are happier than their unmarried counterparts. . . . Some disagreement may
exist about the magnitude of such effects, but they are almost certainly the result of
marriage, rather than self-selection.” See STEVEn NOCK MARRIAGE IN MEN’S LIVES 3
(1998) (citing numerous studies). For a more recent study, see Alois Sututzer and Bruno
Frey, Does marriage make people happy or do happy people get married, 35 J. OF SOCIOECONOMICS 326, 3--- (2006) (finding that marriage continues to be highly correlated
with happiness for both men and women and that “[i]t is unlikely that . . . selection
effects can explain the entire difference in well-being between singles and married
people.”) See also, Goive Marriage, M. Hughes and C. Style, The Family Life Cycle –
Internal Dynamics and Social Research Consequences, 58 Sociology and Social Res. 5668 (1983) (marriage improves women’s lives substantially).
176
Depressed, sick and poor people are not seen as particularly good marital prospects.
Nonetheless, the studies cited in the note above suggest that it is unlikely that the
benefits of marriage could be entirely do to selection effects.
177
See Bernstein, supra note 8 at 161-163 (and notes cited therein).
178
See Rachel F. Moran, How Second-Wave Feminist Forgot the Single Woman, 33
Hofstra L . Rev 223, 228 (2004).
179
For recent contributions to the feminist critique of marriage and legal family, see
Laura A Rosenbury, Friends With Benefits, 106 MICH L REV 189, 212 (2007) (“Elevating
[family relationships] over friendships contributes to gender inequality by encouraging
individuals to engage in domestic coupling rooted in a history of patriarchy and then
stigmatizing those who lie outside of that coupling” (citations omitted)); Dan Markel,
Jennifer Collins, and Ethan Leib, Criminal Justice and the Challenge of Family Ties,
2007 ILL. L. REV 1147, 1190 (“the family often served (and in some cases, continue[s] to
serve) to perpetuate patriarchy, gender hierarchy, or domestic violence.”) See also, Nancy
Polikoff, We Will Get What We Ask For: Why Legalizing Gay and Lesbian Marriage
Will Not Dismantle the Legal Structure of Gender in Every Marriage, 110 U VA L REV
1555 (1993) .
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subordination was sexualized and how sexualized domination permeated
women’s lives.180 In the words of Catharine MacKinnon, women’s sexuality was
“defined by men, forced on women, and constitutive of the meaning of
gender.”181 In response, numerous women - many of them self-defined feminists
- challenged the feminist orthodoxy asking (to paraphrase Kathryn Abrams)
“what are we supposed to do about sex while we are fighting for freedom?”182
The numerous women - many of them feminists - who continue to enter into the
institution of marriage may be asking a comparable question, “what are we
supposed to do about family while we are fighting for freedom?”
Much of the feminist critique of marriage argues that marriage is, as
MacKinnon said women’s sexuality was, “defined by men, forced on women and
constitutive of the meaning of gender.”183 Yet despite what has been a century of
feminist criticism of marriage,184 there still appears to be something in marriage
that many women – including women with a strong commitment to gender
equality – value. 185 Even while conceding that the institution of marriage is
deeply infused with patriarchal norms and hidden forms of oppression, most
women enter it willingly. It could be that most women are just terribly
misguided about how bad marriage will be, or it could be that many women have
180

Kathryn Abrams, Sex Wars Redux, 95 COL. L. REV. 304, 307-310.
CATHARINE MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 149 (1989).
182
Abrams, supra note 180 at 311(“sex radicals argued [that] the subordination of
pleasure to a virtually exclusive focus on identifying and preventing danger deprived
women of a resource vital to self-understanding and resistance. The sex radicals asked
“what women were supposed to do about sex while they were fighting for freedom.””)
183
See Rosenbury, supra note 179 at 219 (“marriage, as shaped by the state, plays a vital
role in maintaining gender inequality”); Markel, Collins and Leib, supra note 179 at 1193
(“benefits to the family facilitate the perpetuation of gender hierarchy and domestic
violence”); Polikoff, supra note 179 at 1536 (marriage is “the worst of mainstream
society” and “an inherently problematic institution.”).
184
For early critiques see Emma Goldman, Marriage and Love, in Red Emma Speaks
158, 164-`65 (Alix Kates Shuman ed., 1972) (The institution of marriage makes a
parasite of woman . . . It incapacitates her for life’s struggle, annihilates her social
consciousness, paralyzes her imagination, and then imposes it gracious protection, which
is in reality a snare, a travesty on human character.”)
185
Commitment to gender equality is correlated to educational level, as is marriage rate.
For the link between commitment to gender equality and education, see Richard J. Harris
& Juanita M. Firestone, Changes in Predictors of GenderRole Ideologies Among Women:
A Mutlivariate Analysis, 38 SEX ROLES 239, 240 (1998). Fro the link between marriage
rate and education, see
Detp. Health and Human Services, Natl. Center for Health
Statistics, Cohabitation,, Marriage, Divorce and Remarriage in the United States 4
(2002) (“In addition to race and employment status, other characteristics of individuals
that have been found to be related to higher probability of getting married include higher
education
and
earnings.”)
See
http://wwwaamft.org/Press_Room/CDC_series23_7_2002.pdf
181
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decided that there is something worthwhile in the marital norms that state and
culturally sponsored marriage impart. The analysis above suggests that what
women may value is the human flourishing that seems to flow from fusion with
another and the nourishment one gets from a defined community that can close
its doors to the outside world.186
This line of argument would also explain why so many gay men and lesbians
want to get married. Some commentators bemoan the elevation of “we”
language in contemporary gay discourse,187 but there is little doubt that within the
gay community there is a strong endorsement of the we.188 Committed,
interdependent, hard-to-break relationships matter powerfully to people and the
law plays a role in making those relationships more committed, interdependent
and hard to break. When the law recognizes marital relationships, it fosters and
facilitates the formative and constitutive roles that those relationships can play in
people’s lives.
B. The Law and the Importance of Parental Relationships
1. Parenthood as Constitutive
When the law recognizes parental relationships, it fosters and facilitates the
formative and constitutive role that parenthood plays in people’s lives also. The
justification for the legal treatment of parenthood almost perfectly parallels the
justification for the legal treatment of marriage. Parenthood enables people to
feel powerful love, to fuse with others and to reconstitute themselves in the
context of relationship. Like marriage partners, children are critical sources of
love. Adults have children, Jeffrey Bluestein writes “not because . . . [children]
will continue the family, or are potential sources of relief and aid, but because
they are new bonds of love.”189 Like marriage, parenthood requires a
relinquishment of self, a fusing of self with other such that a parent’s decision to

186

As Anne Dailey remarked “while the closed doors of the home have shielded abuse,
isolation and exploitation, they have at the same time nurtured love and commitment.”
Anne Dailey, Constitutional Privacy and the Just Family, 67 TULANE L. REV. 955, 1021
(1993).
187
See Katherine M. Franke, The Politics of Same-Sex Marriage Politics, 15 COLUM. J.
GENDER & L. 236, 239 (2006) (“the rights-bearing subject of the lesbigay right
movement has now3 become ‘the couple’ – a We. It is a domesticated couple and it is a
couple that seeks a particular location within a genealogical kinship grid that sutures the
couple to the nation.” )
188
See e.g., JONATHAN RAUCH, GAY MARRIAGE (2004) and the numerous same sex
marriage cases brought by claimants eager to be considered a “we.”
189
Jeffrey Blustein, Child Rearing and Family Interests, in HAVING CHILDREN 115, 118
(Onora O’neill & William Ruddick eds,. 1979).
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run into a burning building to save her child can hardly be construed as an act of
altruism.190 It is an act of self-interest.
Being a parent is also a means of re-constructing oneself.191 Parenting
requires accepting the responsibility that allows one to achieve what Katharine
Bartlett refers to as an “ennobled self.”192 The ability to construct oneself in this
ennobled way, to accept the responsibility for “nurturing and loving and
educating one’s children . . . is central to our conception of human
flourishing.”193 As David Richards suggests “[c]hild-rearing is one of the ways
in which many people fulfill and express their deepest values about how life is to
be lived.”194
The constitutional parental rights cases, including Meyer v. Nebraska,195
Pierce v. Socy of Sisters,196 Prince v. Mass.,197 Wisconsin v. Yoder,198 and
Parham v. J.R.,199 particularly when coupled with other “parent-like” cases,
Moore v. City of East Cleveland,200 and Smith v. OFFER,201recognize that
parenthood plays a key constitutive role in people’s lives. Thus, allowing the
state to bar parents from pursuing certain desired educational paths for their
children would offend the “relation between individual and state . . . upon which
our institutions rest”202 because restrictions on children almost inevitably operate
as restrictions on parents also. An adult must be free to steer a child in the “ways
190

Mit Regan explores this kind of hypothetical, suggesting that a stranger’s decision to
rescue a drowning child can barely be analyzed on the same terms as a mother’s because
the mother’s “decision” seems so much like an instinctive at of self-preservation. REGAN
supra note 136 at 113.
191
At a colloquial level every parent understands this. That is why so many parents come
to see their lives as having two very distinct phases, pre-children and parental, and those
phases are not just about sleep deprivation and the facility with which one changes a
diaper or installs a car seat.
192
Katharine T. Bartlett, Re-Expressing Parenthood, 98 YALE L. J. 293, 301 (1988)
(citing Nel Noddings, CARING: A FEMININE APPROACH TO ETHICS AND MORAL
EDUCATION 5) (1984)).
193
Stephen Gilles, On Educating Children: A Parentalist Manifesto, 63 U. CHI. L. REV.
938, 962 (1996)
194
David A. J. Richards, The Individual, The Family and The Constitution, A
Jurisprudential Perspective, 55 NYU L. REV 1, 28 (1980).
195
262 US 390 (1923).
196
268 US 510 (1925).
197
321 US 158 (1944)
198
406 US 205 (1972).
199
442 US 584 (1979).
200
Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 US 494 (1977).
201
Smith v. OFFER, 431 US 816 (1977)
202
Meyer, 262 US at. 628.
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he should go.”203 The state cannot “standardize its children” by requiring that
they go to public school.204 In dissent, in Bowers v. Hardwick, Justice Blackmun
wrote that the Constitution protects parenthood because “parenthood alters so
dramatically an individual’s self-definition.”205 The parent- child relationship
serves as a source of independent identity for both parent and child.
The Court has also made clear that the “the importance of the familial
relationship, to the individuals involved and to the society, stems from the
emotional attachments that derive from the intimacy of daily association, and
from the role it plays in ‘promoting a way of life’.”206 “It is through the family
that we inculcate and pass down many of our most cherished values, moral and
cultural.”207 In Prince (a parenthood case), the Court foreshadowed the language
in Griswold (a marriage case), referring to the interests at stake in child-rearing
as “sacred.”208 That sacredness was made all the more explicit in Wisconsin v.
Yoder,209 which respected parents’ rights to withdraw their children from public
school at age 14 because the rights of parents include the right to raise children
within the tenets of the Amish religion. It was impossible to afford the parents
religious freedom without affording them parental freedom because the freedom
to believe and act in accordance with their religious beliefs, a freedom that we
often consider a basic individual right, includes a basic relational right, the right
to raise one’s children in accordance with those beliefs.
The way the Constitution honors the potential for people to enrich and define
themselves through parenthood is by leaving the parental relationship alone. “It
is cardinal with us that the custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in the
parents, whose primary function and freedom include preparation for obligations
the state can neither supply nor hinder.”210 Parents are allowed to structure their
relationships with their children as they choose. There are mandatory schooling
laws, and child labor restrictions and the outside boundaries of abuse and neglect,
203

Prince, 321 US at 164 (referring to parent’s interest in raising child as “sacred private
interests”).
204
Pierce v. Socy of Sisters, 268 US 510, 535 (1925)
205
Bowers v.Hardwick, 478 US 186, 205 (1985) (Blackmun, J. dissenting) (citing Moore
at 500-06). Bowers had to do with a consensual sexual relationship between two adults
(in some sense, marriage-like); Moore had to do with a relationship between a
grandmother and her grandchild (in some sense parent-like). Again, when the Court
writes about why it protects either marriage or parenthood, it tends to conflate the
reasons.
206
Smith v. OFFER, 431 US at 843 (quoting Griswold)
207
Moore, 431 US at 503-04.
208
Prince, 321 US at 165. See also Griswald, supra note 141 (marriage is “intimate to the
degree of being sacred.”)
209
406 US 205 (1972).
210
Prince v. Mass., 321 US 158, 166 (1944).
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but, for the most part, the state steers clear of interfering with the parental
relationship. Parents are presumed to act in their children’s best interest.211 As
recently as 1989, Justice Brennan re-affirmed the soundness of the substantive
due process cases that treated the parental relationship as outside of the ambit of
state regulation.212
In most of these cases, the Court was not careful to separate out the interests
of the parents and the interests of the children,213 and in Parham v. J.R., the court
realized that such an effort was probably pointless. The child’s “interest is
inextricably linked with the parents’ interest in and obligation for the welfare and
the health of the child.”214 Child and parent are one for legal purposes.215
2. The Parallels to Marriage
This explication of the parental rights cases suggests that parenthood and
marriage are protected for comparable reasons. Indeed, the parental rights cases,
more explicitly than the marriage cases, explain why it is that the law needs to
care about relationship rights and obligations at all. The law needs to honor
family relationship rights because family relationships provide critical sources of
identity. They steer people in directions they would not go but for the
relationship.216 They afford people a sense of being “inextricably linked” with
another,217 and they treat “rights and high dut[ies]”218 as coming of a piece.

211

Parham v. J.R., 442 US 584 (1979).
Citing Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 US 390 (1923) and Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 US
510 (1925), Justice Brennan wrote “ I think I am safe in saying that no doubts the wisdom
or validiy of those decisions.” Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 US 110, 143 (1989)
(Brennan, J. dissenting).
213
But see Justice Douglas dissenting in Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 US 205, 244 (1972)
(“On this important and vital matter of education, I think the children should be entitled
to be heard”). See also Woodhouse, supra note 13 (arguing that the refusal to consider
the children’s perspectives in Meyer and Pierce reflects a paradigm that inappropriately
treats children as property.).
214
442 US 548 [2503]. The Court acknowledged that “some parents may at times act
against the interest of their children . . but [that] is hardly reason to discard wholesale
those pages of human experience that teach that parents generally do act in the children’s
best interest.” [2504].
215
In Troxel v. Granville, 530 US 57 (2000), the Court backtracked from this position
somewhat, finding that grandparents may have a right to visit their grandchildren against
the wishes of a parent, if it is in the child’s best interest. Courts are still required to
(rebuttably) presume, however, that parents do act in the best interest of their children.
216
See Prince 321 US at 164 (parents have the right to steer children “in the way they
should go.”)
217
Parham, 442 US at 2503-04.
218
Pierce, 268 US at 535.
212
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Family relationships allow us to share the “intimacy of daily association”219
which in turn allows us to “pass on our most cherished values . . . .”220
In his article on marriage, Cass Sunstein writes that when the Court evaluated
the constitutional dimensions of marriage it “went off track [and into the cases
involving parenting and procreation] because of the intuitive connection between
sexuality and reproduction (protected by substantive due process) and marriage
(not easily analyzed in the same terms).”221 To assume that marriage cannot be
analyzed in the same terms as parenting and procreation may well be to assume
something wrong about the legal treatment of parenting or marriage, however.
Marriage, like parenthood, shapes identity. Both marriage and parenthood create
sources of loyalty and intimacy that root one in something other than oneself or
the state222 In striking down the regulations in Meyer and Pierce, the Court
emphasized the important mediating function that families can play as an interim
institution between the individual and the state.223 By citing Meyer and Pierce in
Griswald224 and Zablocki,225 the Court suggested that marriage plays that
intermediary role as well.
Comparably, the birth control and abortion cases, decided under substantive
due process doctrine, say something about the constitutional import of
219

Smith v. OFFER, 431 US at 844. ,
Moore, 431 US at 503-04
221
Sunstein, supra note 8 at 2097.
222
Intermediary institutions can be critical sources of identity, see Anne C. Dailey,
Federalism and Families, 143 U PENN L. REV 1787, 1858-1960 (1995) (discussing the
communitarian argument about the “constitutive effect that social affiliations have on the
development of the human identity.”)
and critical buffers from the state. As Jean Eshtain writes, “it is no coincidence that all
20th century totalitarian orders labored to destroy the family as a locus of identity and
meaning apart from the state.” JEAN ELSHTAIN, THE FAMILY AND CIVIC LIFE 55 For
more on the importance of intermediary institutions, see Gerald E. Frug, The City as a
Legal Concept, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1059, 1088 (1980).
223
The Court in Meyer explained that American values were critically different than
those proposed by Plato in the IDEAL COMMONWEALTH. Plato described a world in
which all training of young males was the responsibility of the state. The Court wrote:
“Although such measures have been deliberately approved by men of great genius, their
ideas touching the relation between individual and the state were wholly different from
those upon which our institutions rest.” 262 US at 402. In Prince the Court wrote, “The
child is not the mere creature of the state; those who nurture him and direct his destiny
have the right, couples with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional
obligation. “ 268 US 510 at 535. For more on this, see Dailey, supra, note 186 at 1017
(“constitutional protection of the family ought to reflect an understanding of the family’s
distinct role as a vital interim institution serving the communal ends of political life”)
224
381 US at 481.
225
434 US at 381.
220
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relationship. The liberty interests served both by allowing people to procreate226
and allowing them not to227 have everything to do with affording people some
measure of control over which and what kind of relationships will come to define
them. The rights to abortion and birth control are not just about the rights to be
free of an unwanted pregnancy, they are about the rights to be free of unwanted
relationships.228 Those rights are important because of the ways in which
relationships, particularly relationships that are understood by the parties and by
others to be familial, define who we are.229
C. Summary
Just as the analogy to marital status helped elucidate what claims to parental
status are, so the analogy to parental rights helps elucidate why the law should
(or must) recognize marriage-like relationships. The parental rights cases suggest
that the legal rights and obligations that accompany family relationship play a
formidable and constitutive role in who is. The status of the parental figures in
these cases was never doubt. What was in doubt was the extent to which that
status included the right to be treated as legally connected and why. The cases
suggest that the totality of the legal incidents associated with legally recognized
relationships, including claims on the other, obligations to the other, and the right
to be considered as a unit, shape people’s understanding of who they are. This
understanding of why parental relationships are important to parents and children
226

Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 US 535 (1942) (striking down a state law requiring
sterilization of developmentally disabled people)
227
See abortion and procreation cases, supra notes 52 and 145.
228
Admittedly, this right is gendered. Women have the right to terminate a potential
relationship in a way that men do not and because a mother can effectively prevent a
father from relinquishing his paternal relationship, see Baker, Bargaining or Biology,
supra note 38 at 9-10. Men can have parental relationships forced on them. This
gendered (and arguably unfair) treatment of relationship in the parental context may have
come from the recognition that for years men just walked away from parental
relationships without much fear of ever being dragged back into them., legally or
emotionally.
229
To suggest that the constitutional treatment of marriage has nothing to do with these
other treatments of relationship may be to suggest that marriage is some lesser form of
relationship than parenthood, arguably either because the marital relation is somehow a
legal construct in the way that other family relationships are not, or because parental
relationships are simply more important to people than marital ones. Both of those
assumptions are misguided. The law has always defined parental status pursuant to a set
of criteria that it set, sometimes involving biology sometimes not. See supra notes 89-93
and text accompanying.. Parenthood, particularly fatherhood, is no more pre-legal than
is marriage. Moreover, marriage appears to be just as, if not a more, important as
parenthood in helping men define themselves in the world. See NOCK supra note 175
(passim). If the relation of parent to child is worthy of constitutional protection because
of the way in which that relation shapes our identity, than the relation of spouse to
spouse may well be also.
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finds support in the psychological and philosophical theories of adult relationship
and family.

V. CONSTITUTIONAL CONFUSION
A. Confused Nomenclature
Part of the reason the connection between marriage and parenthood has not
been made more clearly may stem from the imprecise and somewhat circular
language the Court has used to protect family relationships. Three related and
overlapping terms are often used: intimacy, privacy and autonomy. When
speaking about family relationships, the Supreme Court has used the word
intimacy frequently,230 though it has never articulated a right to emotional or
physical intimacy. Instead, there is (maybe) a right to privacy and there are
doctrines of family and parental autonomy. Scholars of the court and of these
concepts suggest that the terms all have something to do with each other.
In his famous article on privacy and autonomy,231 published just after Roe v.
Wade, Louis Henkin argued that when the Supreme Court used the word privacy
it really meant autonomy, or the right to be free from governmental regulation.232
In her famous article on privacy, Ruth Gavison argued that there are actually two
kinds of privacy, the right to self-determination (often thought of as autonomy)
and the right not to have facts about oneself known. In his article on intimate
associations, Kenneth Karst argued that this latter right, the right not to have facts
disclosed, is also part of our understanding of what constitutes intimacy.233 The
other understanding of intimacy involves “close and enduring association
between people”234 or relationship. Meanwhile, Jennifer Nedelsky argues that
the term autonomy has no meaning outside the context of relationship. “When
we ask ourselves what enables people to be autonomous, the answer is not
isolation, but relationships.”235 Thus, a right to privacy may be a right to
autonomy, which has no meaning outside the context of relationship.
Diagramatically, the etymology looks something like this:

230

Griswold, 381 US at 486 (in context of marriage); SMITH , 431 US at 843 (in context
of parental-type relationships).
231
Louis Henkin, Privacy and Autonomy, 74 COLUM. L. REV 1410 (1974).
232
Id.
233
“The first meaning of intimacy is synonymous with one of the meaning of privacy: an
intimate fact is a private fact, the sort of information about a person that is not normally
disclosed.” Karst, supra note 128 at 636.
234
Id.
235
Jennifer Nedelsky, Reconceiving Autonomy: Sources, Thought and Possiblitites, 1
YALE J. L. AND FEMINISM 7, 12 (1989).
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Privacy
Privacy

Right to not Have
Facts Disclosed

Right to
Self-determination

Intimacy

Autonomy

Close and Enduring
Relationships

This etymological overlap helps explain some of the doctrinal confusion with
regard to relationship. Sometimes that which is protected when we protect
relational privacy is the right not to have things disclosed,236 but sometimes it is
the right to self-determination.237 Sometimes, by autonomy, we mean the right to
be free from governmental regulation,238 but sometimes we mean the right to be

236

The communication privilege is the most obvious example, but so is the kind of
privacy the court seemed eager to protect in Griswold – the right not to have the
government snooping around one’s bedroom.
237
The right not to be a parent protected in Roe can be viewed as a right to selfdetermination as can the right of Mr. Redhail to reconstitute himself in the context of
relationship. In both contexts, the Court used the word privacy to describe what it was
protecting. See Roe, 410 US at 152-153; Zablocki . 434 US at 384.
238
The court in Prince referenced parental “freedom” to raise their children as they
wanted, 321 US at 166 and the court in Loving spoke of the “freedom” of choice to
marry, 388 US at 12.
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treated as intertwined with others.239 What makes intimate relationships special is
that they are both private and autonomous. The people in them exclude the rest
of the world, but include each other in a way that makes them both independent
and interdependent. When the Supreme Court recognizes the importance of
relationship, it is acknowledging the critical role that relationship can play in our
lives and it is acknowledging the importance of treating relationships as entities
unto themselves.
B. A Due Process Requirement?
Given the primary role that legally recognized family relationships play and
have always played in people’s lives, there is a strong argument that the
Constitution must recognize family rights in some way. In his article on the
constitutional dimensions of tort law, John Goldberg argues that the Constitution
requires the state to provide “bodies of law that fit certain descriptions, including
laws of ownership, familial relations and enforceable agreements, as well as law
for the redress of wrongs.”240 Goldberg rests much of his argument on the
historical role that the government has played in the redress of private wrongs,241
but his arguments from history work just as well in family relations as they do in
tort. Indeed, the Court has relied heavily on history to explain why it feels
compelled to protect the family, despite there being no mention of the family in
the Constitution. “The fact that no particular provision of the Constitution
explicitly forbids the State from disrupting the traditional relation of the family –
a relation as old and as fundamental as our entire civilization – surely does not
show that the Government was meant to have the power to do so.”242 “Our
decisions establish that the Constitution protects the sanctity of the family
because the institution of the family is deeply rooted in the Nation’s history and
tradition.”243
Just as government has always provided some redress for private wrongs and
therefore might be compelled to continue to provide some floor of redress, so the
government has always recognized some family rights and obligations and
therefore may be compelled to continue to do so. Exactly what the floor is, as
Goldberg suggests, will be a function of a variety of factors, including
239

Meyer, Pierce, Prince and Parham all suggest that part of what parental autonomy
means is the right to have the state view the parent-child relationship as an entity, instead
of treating parents and children as separate.
240
John C.P. Goldberg, The Constitutional Status of Tort Law, 115 YALE L. J. 524 (2005)
(emphasis added).
241
Steven Heyman has also argued that history strongly supports a Constitutional
requirement that the state provide a bare minimum of protection from for private wrongs.
See Steven J. Heyman, The First Dut7y of Government: Protetion, Liberty and the
Fourteenth Amendment, 41 Duke L J 707 (1992).
242
Griswold, 381 US at 496 (Goldberg concurring).
243
Moore, 431 US at 1938.
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contemporary understandings of (in the tort context) wrongs and (in the
relationship context) family.244
Thus, Goldberg finds no problem in the
elimination of the torts of seduction or alienation of the affections because
evolving understandings of women’s rights and women’s agency coupled with
women’s ability to sue in their own right rendered questionable whether the
“wrongs” originally meant to be addressed were still considered wrongs.245
Comparably, the current tendency to recognize marital and parental rights
even if not legal status as spouse or parent suggests that contemporary
understandings of legally relevant relationships have progressed some. The state
supreme courts in California, Vermont and New Jersey found themselves
constitutionally obliged to grant the rights and obligations of marriage even
though they did not feel compelled to grant marriage to gay men and lesbians.246
Courts and legislatures often feel compelled to grant parental rights even if not
the status of parenthood.247
When someone who has lived with, cared for, shared with and provided for a
partner for years on end, presents him or herself to a court, arguing that for the
right to be recognized as a legally relevant person in that partner’s life, the
“relation between individual and state . . . upon which our institutions rest”248
may require the state to acknowledge the legitimacy of that relationship. When
someone who has lived with, cared for, shared with and provided for a child
presents him or herself to a court, pleading for the right to be recognized as a
legally relevant person in that child’s life, a court may be compelled to recognize
a liberty interest in “the emotional attachments that derive from the intimacy of
daily association.”249 The floor for state-recognized relationship rights may be
shifting up.
Professor Goldberg is careful to point out that his notion of due process does
not treat “as natural or neutral a set of baselines for constitutional analysis
arbitrarily drawn from the common law.”250 Instead, he is suggesting that
scholars should “self-consciously theorize a connection between public and
244

For the list of factors Goldberg would use to determine the floor, see Goldberg, supra
note 240 at 613.
245
Id. (The conversion of the husband’s property interest in his wife’s body, or the
disruption of the marital relation no longer seemed like wrongs).
246
See discussion of Baker v. Vermont and Lewis v. Harris supra notes 36-38 and text
accompanying.
247
See supra text accompanying notes 13, 37-40.
248
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 US at 628.
249
Smith v. OFFER, 431 US at 843. In Smith, the majority assumed without deciding
that foster parents developed a protected liberty interest as parents by living with,
providing for and loving their foster children, even if they never asked for legal status as
parents.
250
Goldberg, supra note 240 at 625
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private law.”251 The tension between the lofty constitutional discourse protecting
family status, on the one hand, and the statutory or common law incidents of
legal relationship, on the other, cries out for such a unifying theory in the family
law context. As Goldberg notes, “there is a long tradition of holistic thinking in
Anglo-American constitutional law, one that treats private law not as sub or nonconstitutional, but as part of an overall constitutional order.”252 Understanding
the constitutional protection of relationship as incorporating many of the state
laws that treat two as one, in ways that both expand and restrict autonomy,
follows that tradition of holistic thinking.
C. Summary
Though often confused by its own overlapping rhetoric, the Supreme Court
has consistently recognized that significant autonomy, privacy and intimacy
values are implicated by the legal treatment of family relationship. The law has
always facilitated and helped sustain family relationships by treating them as
distinct and free to flourish (or not) pursuant to their own rules, but governed, if
at an end, by notions of fusing and sharing. Given how critical these
relationships are to peoples’ lives and how strong a role the law has always
played in protecting them, courts and legislatures seem to sense some affirmative
obligation to recognize family-like relationships. The current trend to provide
the rights of relationship to non-traditional family members, even while resisting
the expansion of traditional notions of family status, may reflect a sense of this
affirmative duty.

VI. CONSEQUENCES
Regardless of whether one thinks states must provide some minimal
rubric of relationship rights, and regardless of whether one thinks the current
tendency to disaggregate relationship rights from family status provides adequate
redress to those who fail to secure family status, it is not clear that the tendency
to disaggregate marital and parental rights from their corresponding statuses is a
good idea for those who care about the legal protection of relationships.
Disaggregation undermines the social meaning of both marriage and parenthood.
It also tends to minimize the importance of family obligation and thus makes
legally recognized relationship less formative. Finally, disaggregation makes it
much less likely that courts will continue to honor the doctrine of family
autonomy. This Part explores these likely consequences of disaggregation.
A. Diminution in Meaning
As the traditional incidents of marriage and parenthood are increasingly
disaggregated from the statuses with which they are associated, the social
meaning of the statuses themselves is diffused. It is harder to know what both
251
252

Id.
Id.
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marriage and parenthood mean in a world in which many who do not have the
status are treated as if they do. The Supreme Court of New Jersey recognized
this irony when it denied same sex couples the right to the status of marriage in
part because it had granted them the incidents of marriage: “plaintiffs’ claimed
right to the name of marriage is surely not the same now that equal rights and
benefits must be conferred on committed same-sex couples.”253 The Court thus
explicitly acknowledged that the marital label loses some of its importance if
people can acquire rights without the label.
In addition to the status losing potence when the rights with which it is
associated can be dissociated from the label, the social norms that inform the
status’ meaning (and are a key part of its stability) may be undermined by the
existence of alternative legally recognized relationships. As Elizabeth Scott
writes “marriage gets its stability in part from the intricate web of social norms
regulating spousal behavior.”254 Marriage alternatives may not incorporate those
social norms and it is not clear that marriage can retain them in the face of
alternatives. If states develop many ways of viewing partners as in relationship
with each other, there will be less reason for people to “know immediately” what
the relationship means because it will be harder to internalize which social norms
apply to which relationships.
Perhaps the social norms that we now associate with marriage will continue
to attach to those who marry even if there are alternative relationships available,
but alternative statuses will likely have a weaker norm network supporting
them.255 This will affect not only the people in those alternative statuses, but
people in marriages as well. If people who are in domestic partnerships feel less
bound by norms of stability and fidelity and if a married person knows many
people in domestic partnerships, the married person’s allegiance to those
traditional marital norms may seem far less obligatory.256
If marriage does come to seem less important, as the New Jersey Supreme
Court suggests that it will once alternative partnership paradigms are recognized,
and if marital norms lose more of their strength, as may happen with alternative
paradigms providing what will likely be weaker norms, then there is every reason
to believe that the proliferation of alternatives to marriage, even though created
in the name of preserving marriage, will ultimately undermine the institution. At
253

Lewis v. Harris ,908 A.2d at 450.
Elizabeth S. Scott, A World Without Marriage, 41 FAM. L. Q. 537, 562 (2007).
255
It is likely that any norms accompanying civil unions or domestic partnerships will be
weaker than norms accompanying marriage simply because those statuses are new and
people have not had time to internalize the norms associated with them.
256
It could cut the other way. Married people might feel more bound by traditional
marital norms precisely because there were alternatives available and they chose
marriage. I am not contending that the availability of alternatives will necessarily erode
the social norms associated with marriage. I am only contending that it may.
254
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a minimum, it will make claims to marital status seem more frivolous because it
will be less clear that those who are deprived of marriage are deprived of
anything significant.
Creating alternative legal forms of parent-like relationships will likely have a
comparable effect. It is already clear that creating alternative forms of parenthood
dilutes the parental rights of those who are otherwise parents. Here, it is
important to underscore a key difference between marriage and parenthood.
Expanding the kinds of marital-like relationships available does not alter the
legal rights and obligations associated with marriage. 257 The rights and
obligations of different unions may vary depending on whether they are
marriages or civil unions or domestic partnerships and, as just discussed, the
social meaning and social norms associated with those unions may vary, but if A
is married to B and C is domestic partnered with D, A’s legal rights and
obligations vis a vis B will not be affected by C’s legal rights and obligations vis
a vis D.258 Parenthood is more complicated legally. If A and B are parents of C,
and D is a de facto Parent of C, then D’s semi-parental status undermines the
legal rights and obligations of A and B. The more of a privilege that D has to
exercise visitation or custodial rights, the less exclusive are A and B’s rights as
parents.
If, as may well be the case,259 we are moving toward a world in which it is far
more common for more than one or two people to have relationship claims to a
child, then it is likely that the social meaning of parenthood will diminish in
importance. If, for instance, it is relatively common for a child to have a de
Facto parent in addition to one or two “regular” parents, then it is unlikely that
claims for parental status per se will have much resonance. Why should someone
like Michael H. be awarded the status of father if it is commonplace for people
like him to get visitation rights without having parental status? Misters Quilloin
and Lehr260 would not need to block the adoption of their biological child by
another man; they could just assume 3rd party rights. Or the mother’s new
husband could. In other words, just as the proliferation of many legal forms of
partnerships may make claims to marriage itself seem frivolous, so the
proliferation of many forms of quasi-parenthood may make claims to parental
status per se seem frivolous.
257

This assumes a world without polgyny and polyamory. A world with multiple
marriage partners would present the same problems as the kinds of issues we currently
have with multiple parenthood. For a thoughtful discussion suggesting that maybe we
should not automatically take polyamory off the table, see Elizabeth Emens,
Monogamy’s Law: Compulsory Monogamy and Polyamorous Existence, 29 NYU REV. L
& SOC. CHANGE 277 (2004).
258
As just suggested, the social norms associated with A’s partnership with B may affect
the social norms associated with C’s marriage to D.
259
See Bartlett, supra note 40; Baker, Bionormativity, supra note 37 .
260
See supra text accompanying notes 96-98.
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B. Diminution in Burden, Diminution in Benefit
As detailed above, the often harsh and restrictive obligations that the law
imposes on marital partners and parents makes sense in light of the ways in
which people are enriched and ennobled when the law treats two as one. In
crafting the legal rules that require sharing and assume fusing, the law helps
people transcend self through relationship. It is because the desire to transcend
self in this way is so primary and constitutive that the government may have an
obligation to recognize family rights and obligations.
When separating the incidents of status from the statuses themselves,
however, courts and legislatures have demonstrated a clear preference for
bestowing the benefits of relationship, while not necessarily imposing relational
obligations. In the domestic partnership area, employers and legislators are much
more likely to allow partners access to third party benefits (health and disability
insurance) than to require domestic partners to share property or assume longterm financial responsibility for each other.261 In the parental area, courts and
legislators are clearly more comfortable awarding visitation than imposing child
support obligations.262
Creating these “marriage-lite”263 and “parenthood-lite” arrangements ignores
the important psychological and constitutive benefits that come from obligation.
The legal rules that make family members responsible for one another help
define our social understanding of family obligation. That social understanding
in turn informs our conceptualization of family and, most likely, our personal
interpretations of connection and obligation. How fused does one feel with
someone else if there is no mutual long term obligation to support? How much
can a parental relationship change who one is if one is not legally required to do
anything for or with the child?
To some, state-imposed family obligations may seem superfluous because
the duty to care derives from emotional, not legal obligations. Yet millions of
ex-spouses try to minimize post-divorce support, just as millions of parents try to
261

See Blumberg, supra note 14 at 1290-1292 (noting how by failing to treat domestic
partnership pension rights the way it treats marital pension rights, the UCLA domestic
partnership program gives domestic partner’s less of a claim on each other’s financial
assets). See also RAUCH, supra note 205 at 43-46 (referring to domestic partnership as
“marriage-lite” and suggesting that such arrangments often don’t include all of the
obligations of marriage.)
262
Compare, e.g., ENO v. LMM, 711 NE 2d 886 (Mass. 1999) (awarding visitation
rights to a non-biological lesbian co-partner in part because of pre-existing agreement to
share parenting) with TF v. BL, Mass. No 09104 (Aug. 25, 2004) (ruling that a preexisting agreement in which the non-biologically related lesbian partner agreed to
provide support for the child was not binding). See generally, Baker, supra note 50 at
121 .
263
See RAUCH, supra note 188 at 31.
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dodge child-support obligations. Would marriage and parenthood carry with
them the same personal or social meaning if their legal meaning changed such
that the law lets people walk away from the family obligations they had once
accepted? Without the traditional obligations of spouse and parent, the roles of
partner and caretaker become much less formative and meaningful and therefore
less worthy of constitutional protection. Over time, if more people in legally
recognized relationships fail to live up to the traditional obligations associated
with those relationships (because the law does not make them) then the need to
honor any non-traditional relationship may decline because those relationships
will be seen as more voluntary and less constitutive.
C. Diminution in Privacy
Finally, the less uniform the social meaning of marriage and parenthood, the
less likely that the law will protect the negative rights and the ideology of privacy
associated with family statuses. The Supreme Court of California emphasized
the importance of family privacy in In Re Marriage Cases. “One very important
aspect of the substantive protection afforded by the . . . constitutional right to
marry is, of course, an individual’s right to be free from undue government
intrusion (or interference with) . . . the right to marital and familial privacy.”264
Yet the more legally varied and individualized family-like relationships become,
the less likely courts will be to respect family privacy because courts will need to
insert themselves inside those families, in order to ascertain the individual rights
and responsibilities involved.
For instance, domestic partners who have access to each other’s health
insurance and rights to hospital visitation, but who do not live in states that treat
domestic partners as married for financial purposes, will be left to rely on notions
of constructive trust, quasi-contract or contract for adjudication of questions
pertaining to property distribution and future financial support. Not only do these
theories often fail to render just or consistent results,265 they involve searching
inquiries into what actually happened during the course of the relationship. In
order to prove a constructive trust that can secure for one an interest in an expartner’s property, plaintiffs must demonstrate the extent of their individual
contributions to the relationship.266

264

In Re Marriage Cases, 76 Cal Rptr 3d 683, 733. The Court went on to say “the
constitutional right to marry . . . obligate[s] the state to . . . protect the core elements of
the family relationship from at least some types of improper interference by others.” Id.
265
See generally, Ira Mark Ellman, “Contract Thinking” was Marvin’s Fatal Flaw, 76
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1365 (2001) (discussing the failure of contract doctrine to
incorporate the variety of factors that should go into a spousal compensation award).
266
See, for instance, Evans v. Wall, 542 So.2d 1055 (Fla. Dist Ct. App. 3d Dist 1989)
(evidence of plaintiff’s contributions of food, telephone service, furnishings, cooking,
washing and cleaning services used to establish a constructive trust that would allow her
to receive a share of her ex-partner’s property); Sullivan v. Rooney, 404 Mass. 160, 533
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Comparably, plaintiffs using claims of implicit contract must parade the
details of their relationship before the court in order to establish the agreement
pursuant to which they expect to collect.267 Even with this evidence, courts often
resist finding implicit contracts. As the New York Court of Appeals wrote in
Marone v. Marone:
As a matter of human experience personal services will frequently be
rendered by two people living together because they value each other’s
company or because they find it a convenient or rewarding thing to do.
For courts to attempt through hindsight to sort out the intentions of the
parties and affix jural significance to conduct carried out within an
essentially private and generally noncontractual relationship runs too
great a risk of error.268

Marone thus required that plaintiffs show an express contract before they can
collect on any promise for future support.
Express contract theories prove to be just as intrusive, however, because
prohibitions on contracts for sexual services mean that courts take the
consideration inquiry very seriously. Thus, in two different cases involving
express contract, California courts found consideration when an ex-partner
served as chauffeur, bodyguard and social and business secretary,269 but not when
another ex-partner served only as social companion and hostess.270 New York
courts have found that foregoing a career opportunity for the sake of a

NE2d 1372 (1989) (evidence plaintiff gave up job as flight attendant and maintained
home for defendant helped establish a constructive trust on the home purchased by her
ex-partner); Minors v. Tyler, 137 Misc. 505 (City Civ. Ct. 1987) (constructive trust is the
appropriate doctrine under which to evaluate male cohabitant’s claim to his ex-partner’s
property); Small v. Harper, 638 SW2d 24 (Tex. App. Houston 1st Dist. 1982) (id. [with
gender’s reversed]).
267
See Watts v. Watts, 448 NW2d 292 (Wis. Ct. App. 1989) (court evaluating extensive
evidence of parties’ behavior and finances; Glasco v. Glasco, 410 NE2d 1325, 1331-32
(Ind. Ct. App. 1980) (“[r]ecovery for parties seeking relief [sh]ould be based only upon
legally viable contractual and/or equitable grounds which the parties could establish
according to their own particular circumstance.” (emphasis added). See also Bright v.
Kuehl, 650 NE2d 311. 315 (Ind. Ct. App 1995) (following Glasco).
268
Marone v. Marone, 413 NE2d 1154, 1157 (NY 1980).
269
Wharton v. Dillingham, 202 Cal. App3d 447 (4th Dist. 1988).
270
Bergen v. Wood, 14 Cal. App. 4th 854 (2d Dist. 1993) (Curiously, the court refused to
find consideration here because the parties’ never cohabited. Thus, apparently,
cohabitation is an essential part of the consideration necessary for a support promise,
even though sexual services alone are an impermissible basis for consideration.)
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relationship is adequate consideration,271 but they will not presume that an
unemployed ex-partner forewent career opportunities.272
It is precisely these kinds of detailed particularities of different relationships
that courts have traditionally eschewed in the name of allowing family
relationships to construct themselves on their own. The parties to a marriage get
to determine what is fair and reciprocal and courts except it as such to the extent
that they are bound to divide the property in half, regardless of the roles taken in
producing it. As discussed, legal obligations and liabilities have attached
because of the fact of family status and regardless of the particular details of
individual family arrangements. The more courts get into the details of
relationships without that status, the less allegiance they may feel to the ideology
of family autonomy in general.
Comparably, a child who has legally cognizable relationships with numerous
adults is a child who is much more likely to have his schooling decisions,
religious upbringing and extracurricular activities determined by a court than by
one or two parents. As of now, adults with parental status have an almost
irrebutable right to visitation and guaranteed standing to assert a claim for
custody. 273 If parents are married, their decisions regarding their children are
presumed to be in their children’s best interest. The quality and content of their
relationships with their children is never at issue.
But if a third party has potential rights, the behavior of both the adults with
parental status and those without it comes under scrutiny. In order to determine
whether a third party non-parent has standing to make a visitation or custody
claim, courts insist on analyzing “the nature of [the] parent and child
relationship.”274 “[W]hile it is presumed that a child’s best interest is served by
maintaining the family’s privacy and autonomy, that presumption must give way
where the child has established strong psychological bonds with a [a non-legal
parent.].”275
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McCullon v. McCullon, 96 Misc 2d 962 (Sup. 1978).
Cohn v. Levy, 725 NYS2d 376 (2d Dpt. 2001) (The Court emphasized that the
plaintiff had not held a job in some time [she had been previously married], but the court
did not explain how it thought she would have provided for herself if she had not been in
the relationship. Presumably, she had to have foregone whatever other means of support
would have kept her provided for, but the court did not acknowledge this.)
273
“Denial of visitation is an extreme remedy, rarely approved.” HARRIS, TEITELBAUM
AND Carbone, supra note at 103
274
Mason v. Dwinnell, 600 SE2d 58, 65.
275
JAL v. EPH, 682 A.2d 1314, 1319-20, (1996), quoted in TB v. LRM, 768 Ad 913,
917 (2001).
272
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It is already clear that in cases of divorce, courts evaluate religious
practices,276choice of community decisions,277 and financial entitlements.278 For
married parents, the ability of parents to make these difficult, value-laden child
rearing decisions is what makes parenthood “central to our conception of human
flourishing.”279 Yet the more people there are with rights to rear one particular
child, the less able any of them are to “inculcate and pass down [their] most
cherished values.”280 The more adults with relationship rights to a child, the
more potential legal disputes there are and the more likely it is that a court, not a
parent, will be determining what is in the child’s best interest. The constitutive
benefits of parenthood, and the privacy of all parents involved, will be seriously
compromised.

VII. CONCLUSION
There is an extensive academic critique of the family suggesting that perhaps
the law should just get out of the family relationship business altogether.281
Despite this critique, many, many people continue to ask the law to recognize
their family relationships. Marriage and parenthood, partnership and caretaking
may look very different today than they did fifty years ago, but for the most part,
people are not rejecting any role for the law in shaping and defining family

276

In re Hadeen, 619 P.2d 372 9Wash 1980); Mentry v, Mentry, 190 Cal. Roptr. 843, 850
(Cal. Ct. App. 1983).
277
Ramirez-Barker v. Barker, 418 SE2d 675, 680 (NC Ct. App 1992 (holding that
primary custodian could not move in order to be closer to relatives); In re Marriage of
Sheley, 895 P2d 850, 856 (Wash. Ct. App 1995) (custodial mother could not move out of
Seattle area).
278
If family income is over a certain amount, courts determine the “realistic needs of the
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relationships, they are asking the law to draw family shapes and make family
definitions that include them.
To the extent that litigants have made constitutional claims to be included in
traditional definitions of family, they have not been that successful.
Constitutions do not afford particularly robust protection to family status.
Claimants have been much more successful in securing relationship rights,
however. Sometimes these rights are granted, under state constitutions, in lieu
of conferring traditional status; sometimes these rights are granted legislatively;
sometimes courts simply create doctrines that recognize relationship rights and
obligations between non-traditional family members.
The prevalence of this legal recognition of non-traditional relationships
suggests that legal actors appreciate the state’s affirmative duty to recognize
relationship rights. Courts and legislatures feel compelled to honor certain
relationships legally even if they don’t feel compelled to afford those
relationships family status. When looked at as a whole, the Supreme Court
doctrine on relationships suggests that there is some constitutional requirement
that the law respect family relationships for reasons other than just their
expressive potential, for reasons that have to do with the formative role that
family relationships play in many people’s lives.
If one believes that the law’s role in fostering and promoting these
relationships is beneficial and important, though, this article suggests that courts
and legislatures should be wary of disaggregating relationship rights from
relationship status in the way that they have. While jealously guarding what it
means to be married and what it means to parent, courts and legislatures have
created an alternative regime of relationship rights that ultimately may undermine
some of the most important ways that the law honors relationship. Cafeteriastyle family rights require a degree of judicial construction, monitoring and
evaluation that is antithetical to the privacy, intimacy and autonomy values that
motivate the law to respect relationship in the first place.
Concretely, what this means is that if one believes in the legitimacy and
importance of legal marriage, then one should be wary of supporting “marriagelite” arrangements because the very existence of alternative structures will foster
a legal culture that is used to inserting itself inside relationships to define and
evaluate them instead of leaving them alone. Comparably, if one believes in the
importance of parental autonomy and privacy, one needs to be wary of
alternative parenting constructs that give courts not only the discretion, but often
the duty, to make traditional parenting decisions.
Conservative and (some) liberals can even agree on the analysis to this point.
They can agree that the disaggregation of rights from status is dangerous. Where
they will part ways is in what to do about it. To conservatives, the response to
the danger will be to try to reign in the liberal social norms and values that have
allowed alternative family forms to flourish. If alternative family forms cease to
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exist in such numbers, the pressure on the law to recognize them will obviously
dissipate.
To liberals who believe that many non-traditional relationships should be
recognized by law, the response to the danger will be to try to fight all the harder
for family status. If non-traditional family members are entitled to marital and
parental rights then they should be entitled to marital and parental status.
Affording them something lesser not only leaves alternative family members
with something lesser, it undermines the institutions of marriage and parenthood
for everyone.
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